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Abstract  
The distinction between intuitive and analytic thinking is common in psychology. However, 
while often being quite clear on the characteristics of the two processes (‘Type 1’ processes are 
fast, autonomous, intuitive, etc. and ‘Type 2’ processes are slow, deliberative, analytic, etc.), 
dual-process theorists have been heavily criticized for being unclear on the factors that determine 
when an individual will think analytically or rely on their intuition. I address this issue by 
introducing a three-stage model that elucidates the bottom-up factors that cause individuals to 
engage Type 2 processing. According to the model, multiple Type 1 processes may be cued by a 
stimulus (Stage 1), leading to the potential for conflict detection (Stage 2). If successful, conflict 
detection leads to Type 2 processing (Stage 3), which may take the form of rationalization (i.e., 
the Type 1 output is verified post hoc) or decoupling (i.e., the Type 1 output is falsified). I tested 
key aspects of the model using a novel base-rate task where stereotypes and base-rate 
probabilities cued the same (non-conflict problems) or different (conflict problems) responses 
about group membership. My results support two key predictions derived from the model: 1) 
conflict detection and decoupling are dissociable sources of Type 2 processing and 2) conflict 
detection sometimes fails. I argue that considering the potential stages of reasoning allows us to 
distinguish early (conflict detection) and late (decoupling) sources of analytic thought. Errors 
may occur at both stages and, as a consequence, bias arises from both conflict monitoring and 
decoupling failures. 
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truthiness (noun) 
1 : "truth that comes from the gut, not books" (Stephen Colbert, Comedy Central's 
"The Colbert Report," October 2005) 
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Introduction 
A few months after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, current Vice President and then Senator Joe 
Biden asked President George W. Bush how he can be so sure that the United States was on the 
right course. Bush responded by putting his hand on the Senator’s shoulder and saying “my 
instincts” (Suskind, 2004). Bush’s faith in his gut feelings in the face of conflicting or 
contradictory evidence is, not incidentally, reminiscent of comedian Stephen Colbert’s concept 
of “truthiness”1. There appears to be a great deal of truth to the idea of truthiness and, in fact, it 
has been known for decades, dating back to Kahneman and Tversky’s heuristics and biases 
research program, that humans often rely on intuition when making decisions (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974; for a recent overview, see Kahneman, 2011).  
An additional point that is rarely emphasized, however, is that gut feelings do not always 
predominate. Some individuals are less likely to “go with their gut” when reasoning (Stanovich 
& West, 1998; 2000) and problems that cue conflicting response outputs have been shown to 
lead to deliberative reasoning (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008). 
Investigations of the factors that undermine intuitive decision making may lead to interventions 
which could be used to avoid future errors; or, in other words, to maximize “truth” and minimize 
                                                          
1 The following is the full quote from Suskind’s New York Times article: “Forty democratic 
senators were gathered for a lunch in March just off the Senate floor. I was there as a guest 
speaker. Joe Biden was telling a story, a story about the president. ''I was in the Oval Office a 
few months after I swept into Baghdad,'' he began, ''and I was telling the president of my many 
concerns'' -- concerns about growing problems winning the peace, the explosive mix of Shiite 
and Sunni, the disbanding of the Iraqi Army and problems securing the oil fields. Bush, Biden 
recalled, just looked at him, unflappably sure that the United States was on the right course and 
that all was well. '''Mr. President,' I finally said, 'How can you be so sure when you know you 
don't know the facts?''' Biden said that Bush stood up and put his hand on the senator's shoulder. 
''My instincts,'' he said. ''My instincts.'' Biden paused and shook his head, recalling it all as the 
room grew quiet. ''I said, 'Mr. President, your instincts aren't good enough!''' The democrat Biden 
and the Republican Bartlett are trying to make sense of the same thing -- a president who has 
been an extraordinary blend of forcefulness and inscrutability, opacity and action.” 
2 
 
“truthiness”. To that end, it has been suggested that one of psychological science’s most pressing 
goals should be to “give debiasing away” to the general public (Lilienfeld, Ammirati, & 
Landfield, 2009).  
I argue that basic cognitive research that explains how debiasing happens in the absence of 
explicit top-down intervention could be a fruitful source of practical benefit in the public sphere. 
In the current work, I attempt to elucidate the cognitive processes that guard against reasoning 
failures by introducing a three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement, along with 4 
experiments that test predictions generated from the model. My goal is to integrate perspectives 
on bias and irrationality that have previously been considered antithetical by breaking the 
reasoning process into stages and components. I argue that a consideration of the bottom-up 
sources of analytic thinking offers a new perspective that leads to novel predictions.  
Dual-processing 
Human reasoning and decision-making is thought to involve two distinct types of 
processes (for reviews, see Evans, 2008; 2010a; Evans & Stanovich, 2013a; Frankish & Evans, 
2009; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 2004): Type 1 processes that are intuitive, fast, autonomous, and 
high capacity; and Type 2 processes that are reflective, slow, and resource demanding. Type 1 
processes are thought to provide default outputs that may be acted upon as explicit 
representations manipulated in working memory via Type 2 processing (Evans, 2010a; 
Thompson, 2013). However, the question of what leads someone to engage deliberate and 
effortful reasoning in lieu of more intuitive and automatic cognitive processes is still unclear and, 
as a result, has been the focus of much recent scholarship and research (e.g., De Neys & 
Bonnefon, 2013; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Evans, 2009; Stanovich, 2009a; Thompson, 2009; 
Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011).  
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One of the criticisms of dual-process theories is that they describe the characteristics of the 
two processes but are unclear on the question of how they operate (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; 
Evans, 2007; 2010b; Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996; Osman, 2004; Stanovich & West, 2000). A 
common claim among dual-process theorists is that Type 2 processes monitor the output of Type 
1 processes (e.g., Evans, 2006; Kahneman & Frederick, 2005; Stanovich, 1999). This default-
interventionist perspective explains how Type 2 processing can be biased by earlier Type 1 
outputs. However, the idea that Type 2 processes are themselves responsible for the instantiation 
of Type 2 processing is clearly problematic. In contrast, parallel form dual-process theories posit 
that both types of processing operate in parallel from the outset of reasoning (e.g., Sloman, 1996; 
2002; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). These parallel-competitive models suggest that bias is common 
because fast Type 1 processes output a response before the slower Type 2 processes can 
complete, though additional Type 2 processing may occur if the two types of processing output 
conflicting responses (for a comparison of default-interventionist and parallel-competitive 
models, see Evans, 2007; Evans & Stanovich, 2013a; Handley & Trippas, 2015). Parallel form 
theories highlight conflict detection as a source of later Type 2 processing, but still assume that 
the monitoring of conflict is itself a Type 2 process. Thus, as has been outlined elsewhere 
(Evans, 2009; Evans & Stanovich, 2013a), neither of the major groups of dual-process theories 
adequately explain important aspects of cognitive architecture because both assume that Type 2 
processing is effectively caused by itself. This is a problem of particular importance because the 
utility and explanatory value of dual-process theories is thought to depend, at least partially, on 
our understanding of the sources of analytic reasoning (Evans, 2009; Stanovich, 2009a; 
Thompson, 2009).  
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In the current work I introduce a new perspective on the factors that lead to Type 2 
engagement. My goal is to investigate the bottom-up (i.e., stimulus-triggered) processes that lead 
to increases in deliberative thought, independent from top-down factors such as instructional 
manipulations (e.g., Evans, Handley, Neilens, Bacon, & Over, 2010) and individual differences 
in analytic thinking disposition (e.g., Stanovich & West, 2008). I combine insights from recent 
dual-process models (De Neys, 2012; Evans, 2009; Stanovich, 2009a; Thompson, 2009) into a 
three-stage model of analytic engagement. Using a version of a classic decision making task, I 
provide evidence for two core claims derived from the model: 1) The detection of conflicts 
between intuitive responses is a key determinant of analytic engagement, but sometimes fails, 
and 2) the deliberative override of an intuitive response in lieu of an alternative is a later source 
of Type 2 processing that is dissociable from earlier increases in Type 2 processing attributable 
to conflict detection. Following previous research, I posit that analytic thinking may take the 
form of either rationalization (i.e., bolstering or verifying an intuitive response) or decoupling 
(i.e., overriding or falsifying an intuitive response in lieu of an alternative). Moreover, I qualify 
my findings in meaningful ways with a top-down source of Type 2 processing: individual 
differences in analytic thinking disposition. Our results indicate that reasoning failures can 
emerge from two sources: 1) Failing to detect bias (leading to a failure to think analytically; e.g., 
Evans, 2007; Kahneman, 2003), or 2) successfully detecting bias (e.g., De Neys, 2012), but 
failing to use analytic thought to override the intuitive response.  
Conflict monitoring and analytic thinking 
Although research has shown that the degree of involvement of Type 2 processing can be 
affected by top-down factors such as instructions (e.g., Daniel & Klaczynski, 2006; Evans, 
Newstead, Allen, & Pollard, 1994; Vadeboncoeur & Markovits, 1999), the amount of time 
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permitted to think (e.g., Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 
2000), and individual differences in thinking disposition (e.g., Stanovich & West, 1998; 2000) 
isolating lower level cognitive processes that lead to Type 2 processing are more important for 
our emerging understanding of the dynamic relation between Type 1 and Type 2 processes in the 
mind. Bottom-up factors can be used to determine which type of processing will dominate. 
Consider the following base-rate problem (from De Neys & Glumicic, 2008, adapted from 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1973): 
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 995 nurses 
and 5 doctors. Paul is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Paul is 34 years 
old. He lives in a beautiful home in a posh suburb. He is well spoken and very 
interested in politics. He invests a lot of time in his career. What is most likely? 
(a) Paul is a nurse. 
(b) Paul is a doctor. 
This problem includes two pieces of information that point to alternative responses. The base-
rate probability (i.e., 995 nurses vs. 5 doctors) indicates that there is a 99.5% chance that Paul is 
a nurse. In contrast, the personality description contains stereotypes that are strongly diagnostic 
of a doctor. A great deal of research has demonstrated that participants tend to strongly favor the 
stereotypical information over the base-rate probability because the stereotype is the more 
intuitive source of information (see Barbey & Sloman, 2007 for a review). Thus, the base-rate 
problem is thought to engender an initial response based on the salient stereotypical information.  
Recent research has also indicated that people are implicitly aware of the conflict 
between base-rate and stereotype, despite the apparent neglect or underweighting of the base-
rates (De Neys, Comheeke, & Osman, 2011; De Neys & Franssens, 2009; De Neys & Glumicic, 
2008; De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008), perhaps because extreme probabilities (as shown 
above) can be processed very rapidly (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012; Pennycook & 
Thompson, 2012; Pennycook, Trippas, Handley, & Thompson, 2014). Importantly for present 
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purposes, one of the key pieces of evidence for the conflict detection hypothesis is an increase in 
response time (RT) for conflict (as above) versus non-conflict (e.g., if there were 5 nurses and 
995 doctors above) base-rate problems even when participants give the stereotypical response2. 
Thus, detection of the conflict between base-rate and stereotype appears to lead to increased 
Type 2 processing (as reflected by increased RT) even in cases where participants give the 
response that is more intuitively salient. In support of this claim, De Neys, Vartanian, and Goel 
(2008) found increased activation in the anterior cingulate cortex, a region of the brain associated 
with conflict detection (see Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000 for review), for stereotypical responses to 
incongruent problems relative to congruent problems. Given the fact that participants gave the 
stereotypical response despite the apparent increase in Type 2 processing, it is likely that they 
spent their time rationalizing the stereotype or, at the very least, weighing the stereotype against 
the base-rate probability (Pennycook & Thompson, 2012). This leads to the appearance of 
“effortful beliefs”: i.e., belief processing that is analytic (Handley, Newstead, & Trippas, 2011; 
Handley & Trippas, 2015; Trippas, Verde, & Handley, 2014). 
The central role of conflict detection as an initiator of Type 2 processing is evidenced by 
a wide range of measures across numerous reasoning tasks (see De Neys, 2012 for a review). 
Indeed, response conflict has long been an important concept in reasoning and decision making 
research (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman, 2000; 
Wilkins, 1928) and much neuropsychological work supports the idea that “conflict” problems are 
processed differently than “non-conflict” problems (Banks & Hope, 2014; Goel & Dolan, 2003; 
Liang, Goel, Jia, & Li, 2014; Prado, Kaliuzhna, Cheylus, & Noveck, 2008; Prado & Noveck, 
                                                          
2 Since the base-rate and stereotype point to the same response for non-conflict (i.e., congruent) 
problems, this comparison is isolated to cases where participants gave the base-rate/stereotype 
response. Naturally, this accounts for the vast majority of responses for congruent problems.   
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2007; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003; Stollstorff, Vartanian, & Goel, 2012). 
Nonetheless, conflict monitoring is not included as a component in most formal dual-process 
reasoning models (e.g., Evans, 2009; Stanovich, 2009a; Thompson, 2009, but see De Neys, 
2012; Handley & Trippas, 2015), perhaps because monitoring has been considered a Type 2 
process (and therefore not a separate component). Moreover, the primary dual-process model 
that does incorporate conflict monitoring – De Neys’ (2012; 2014) logical intuition model – 
focuses entirely on the processes that lead to successful conflict detection and therefore does not 
incorporate differences in the quality of Type 2 processing.  
The primary goal of the current work is to develop a dual-process model that includes 
both a conflict monitoring stage and a Type 2 processing stage that differentiates between 
different levels of analytic engagement. This model could then accommodate both major 
perspectives on the primary cause of biased responding: 1) A failure to engage Type 2 
processing (e.g., Evans, 2007; Kahneman, 2003), and 2) Successfully engaging Type 2 
processing following conflict detection, but failing to override the biased response (e.g., De 
Neys, 2012). These two sources of bias have often been discussed in the context of a debate 
about the modal biased reasoner (see De Neys, 2014 for a review) and, as such, I will also frame 
the perspectives as conflicting. However, this should not be taken to mean that authors such as 
Evans (2007) deny the existence of conflict detection (see Evans, 2009) or that authors such as 
De Neys (2012) deny the existence of analytic engagement failures (see De Neys, 2014). My 
goal here is to assess the models of bias by the respective authors, which include predictions for 
one or the other source of bias but that do not necessarily preclude other factors.   
Cognitive decoupling and analytic thinking 
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Conflict monitoring is not the only bottom-up source of analytic thinking. For example, 
De Neys and Glumicic (2008) also reported an increase in RT for incongruent (i.e., conflict) 
problems relative to congruent (i.e., non-conflict) when participants gave the base-rate response 
to the incongruent problems. In this case, the apparent increase in Type 2 processing is 
potentially a result of a rethinking or decoupling process. Indeed, De Neys and colleagues have 
postulated that participants engaged additional resources to inhibit the prepotent stereotypical 
response (De Neys & Franssens, 2009; De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008; Franssens & De 
Neys, 2009). That is, given the idea that stereotypes cue intuitive (Type 1) responses, additional 
Type 2 processing is therefore thought to be necessary to suppress and override the stereotype 
response in lieu of the base-rate response (Barbey & Sloman, 2007). Again, in support of this 
claim, De Neys, Vartanian, and Goel (2008) found increased activation in the right lateral 
prefrontal cortex (RLPFC) for base-rate responses to incongruent problems relative to congruent. 
The RLPFC is considered a key area involved in response inhibition (see Aron, Robbins, & 
Poldrack, 2004, for a review). Base-rate responses, like stereotypical responses, were associated 
with increased ACC activation. This indicates that participants were able to detect the conflict 
between base-rate and stereotypes for incongruent problems regardless of their ultimate 
response, but cases where the base-rate response was given involved an additional deliberative 
reasoning process relative to when the stereotypical response was given. Considering the 
association between the RLPFC and response inhibition along with the presumed intuitiveness of 
stereotypical information, it is plausible that this additional process consisted of participants 
actively suppressing the stereotypical response. In other words, cognitive decoupling appears to 
be a later source of Type 2 processing relative to conflict detection.   
9 
 
An additional point needs to be clarified. The claim that base-rate responses are usually 
accompanied by an active suppression of the salient stereotypical response via Type 2 processing 
is not the same as claiming that the base-rate response necessarily requires Type 2 processing to 
enter into reasoning (De Neys, 2007). Indeed, a recent set of experiments using an instruction 
manipulation illustrated that both base-rates and stereotypes appear to interfere with each other 
(Pennycook, Trippas, et al., 2014). This cross-interference was evident even when participants 
were forced to respond within a short time-deadline. This finding indicates that both base-rates 
and stereotypes cue Type 1 outputs (see also Brenner, Griffin, & Koehler, 2012). Under this 
account, stereotypes typically dominate reasoning because they cue intuitive responses that come 
to mind more quickly and fluently than the base-rates (Pennycook, Trippas, et al., 2014). 
Stereotypes, in other words, are a more salient source of information than base-rates, but both 
may cue Type 1 outputs. Moreover, decoupling should occur in cases when the base-rate 
response is provided because an intuitive response based on the stereotypical information is 
thought to have come first in the reasoning process and therefore needs to be overridden for an 
alternative response to be given.  
A three-stage model of analytic engagement 
Figure 1 represents my theoretical position. The model was built to describe the 
reasoning process for a problem or cue that elicits multiple conflicting outputs. It formalizes and 
combines distinctions made by previous theorists (e.g., De Neys, 2012; Epstein, 1994; Evans, 
2006; Evans & Stanovich, 2013a; Handley & Trippas, 2015; Sloman, 1996; 2014; Smith & 
DeCoster, 2000; Stanovich, 2004; Strack & Deustch, 2004; Thompson, 2009) by dividing an 
individual reasoning event into stages and components. In the first stage, autonomous Type 1 
processes generate so-called “intuitive” responses. These Type 1 processes are cued by features 
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of the stimulus, do not require working memory or executive functioning, and operate in parallel 
(Evans, 2008; Sloman, 1996, Stanovich, 2004). Given these features, I have inferred that some 
stimuli will cue multiple, potentially competing Type 1 outputs (for a similar perspective, see De 
Neys, 2012; 2014).  
 
Figure 1. Three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement. T1 = Type 1 “intuitive” 
processing. T2 = Type 2 “analytic” processing. IR = Initial Response. IR’s are numbered to 
reflect alternative speeds of generation. IR1 is the most salient and fluent possible response. IRn 
refers to the possibility of multiple, potentially competing, initial responses. AR = Alternative 
Response. IRn refers to the possibility of an alternative response that is grounded in an initial 
response.  
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A second dimension of the initial stage in my model relates to the idea that some initial 
responses come to mind more quickly and fluently than others (Thompson, 2009; Thompson et 
al., 2011; Thompson, Prowse Turner, Pennycook, Ball, Brack, Ophir, & Ackerman, 2013)3. In 
the case of base-rate problems, for example, stereotypes are often used as intuitive lures because 
of the phenomenology of their fluent generation. However, this does not rule out the possibility 
that alternative sources of information can cue an alternative Type 1 output in parallel. As 
discussed above, extreme base-rates presented in simple frequency formats influence response 
time, confidence, and probability estimates in ways diagnostic of Type 1 processing (Pennycook, 
Trippas, et al., 2014). Thus, base-rate problems serve as an example of a case where two 
competing sources of information embedded in a problem can elicit competing initial responses 
(see section 6.5 for further examples). The base-rate problem example is particularly powerful 
given the presumed alternative time-course of the stereotype initial response (IR1) and the base-
rate initial response (IR2). Specifically, stereotypes likely cue initial responses that come to mind 
more quickly (and, as a consequence, more fluently) than do base-rates. For other types of 
problems or cues, it is possible that multiple additional initial responses are elicited, hence IRn 
(see Figure 1). 
The role of the second stage, then, is to monitor for conflict between Type 1 outputs (De 
Neys, 2012; 2014). If no conflict is detected (either because no conflict existed or because of a 
conflict detection failure), the first initial response (IR1) will continue to the third stage where it 
is accepted with cursory analytic (Type 2) analysis. This is the prototypical way in which bias is 
thought to arise: unimpeded and with little effort. If a conflict is successfully detected, however, 
                                                          
3 The key component of Thompson’s (2009) model, metacognitive ‘feelings of rightness’, have 
not been integrated in the version of the three-stage model presented in Figure 1 because our data 
do not speak to metacognitive considerations. This is an important area for future research. 
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more substantive Type 2 reasoning will be engaged. Thus, conflict detection is a bottom-up 
source of analytic engagement.  
The three-stage model then distinguishes between two very different forms of Type 2 
processing, each with different implications for the degree of bias ultimately displayed. 
Rationalization is a form of Type 2 processing where, despite successful conflict detection, the 
reasoner focuses on justifying or elaborating the first initial response (IR1) without seriously 
considering the Type 1 output that was cued by the stimulus, but that did not come to mind as 
quickly and fluently (IR2) as the first initial response (IR1)
4. This leads to a response in line with 
what would typically be considered bias (i.e., one’s strongest intuition, which will often be 
personally relevant), but that has been bolstered by analytic reasoning (an “effortful” belief-
based response; see Handley & Trippas, 2015). This process is traditionally referred to as 
“rationalization” in the reasoning literature (e.g., Wason & Evans, 1975), to highlight the idea 
that the additional consideration is focused on verifying, and not falsifying, the Type 1 output. 
For example, participants typically spend much of their time looking at the card they ultimately 
select on the Wason card selection task, indicating that they are likely focused on rationalizing 
their default response (Ball, Lucas, Miles, & Gale, 2003; Evans, 1996). I note, in addition, that 
rationalization is tied to a substantial body of research on motivated reasoning (see Kunda, 
1990). This research indicates that the instantiation of Type 2 reasoning can sometimes lead to 
the strengthening of a pre-existing belief or attitude, particularly if the belief or attitude is of 
some personal significance.  
                                                          
4 I note that it is possible for more than two Type 1 outputs to be cued by a stimulus. Here I 
isolate our discussion to just two for the sake of simplicity. 
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The second class of Type 2 processes that could result from conflict detection is cognitive 
decoupling (Stanovich, 2004; 2009a). This is perhaps the most prototypical “analytic” process 
and, as such, has dominated the literature on reasoning. Decoupling refers to the additional 
processing necessary to inhibit and override an intuitive response (primarily, IR1). There are 
three obvious possibilities given a decoupling process: 1) IR1 is suppressed in lieu of IR2 which, 
upon reflection, emerges as a stronger alternative, 2) IR1 is suppressed in lieu of some other 
initial response (IRn), and 3) An alternative response (AR) is generated that represents a novel 
amalgamation of initial responses (see section 6.7.3 for further comment on AR).  
The three-stage model is a novel combination of multiple perspectives, which means that 
individual aspects of the model are grounded in previous theory. The idea that some intuitive 
responses come to mind faster than others is an aspect of Thompson’s (e.g., 2009) metacognitive 
dual-process theory. The idea that conflicting Type 1 outputs may cue analytic thinking is the 
core of De Neys’ (e.g., 2012) logical intuition model (see also Handley & Trippas, 2015). 
Rationalization (e.g., Wason & Evans, 1975) and decoupling (e.g., Stanovich, 1999) have long 
been discussed in the context of dual-process models, though to the best of my knowledge they 
have not been included as separate classes of Type 2 processing in the same model. Moreover, 
Stanovich and West (2008) have used stages to determine when and if intuitive responses will be 
overridden under the goal of creating a framework for understanding individual differences in 
heuristics and biases tasks (see also Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Here, in contrast, I consider 
the reasoning process as stages to highlight different bottom-up sources of Type 2 processing. 
Previous models have highlighted key aspects of the reasoning process, but have largely left 
unanswered the question of what actually causes Type 2 processing to be engaged.  
14 
 
The goal of the current work is to demonstrate the utility of my three-stage model. This 
will be done in three ways: 1) By investigating the possibility that conflict monitoring may 
sometimes fail (Stage 2), 2) By dissociating increases in Type 2 processing that indicate, on one 
hand, rationalization following successful conflict detection and, on the other hand, cognitive 
decoupling (Stage 3), and 3) By investigating the locus of individual differences in reasoning. 
Individual differences in analytic thinking  
Prior to outlining my specific predictions, it is necessary to discuss an additional source 
of Type 2 processing. Research has indicated that the mere willingness to engage deliberative 
reasoning (i.e., differences in thinking disposition or cognitive style) predicts reasoning 
performance over and above individual differences in the ability to think analytically (i.e., 
cognitive ability or intelligence) (for reviews, see Stanovich, 2004; 2009a; 2011; Stanovich & 
West, 2000). For example, individuals who are actively open-minded are more willing to 
question and perhaps rethink an initial response (Baron, 2008). This disposition, as assessed by a 
number of questionnaires, has been linked to a wide range of reasoning and decision-making 
tasks (Stanovich & West, 1997; 1998; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). Taking the base-rate 
problem as an example, participants who are actively open-minded are more likely to choose the 
base-rate over the stereotype relative to less analytic individuals, presumably because they were 
more willing to think analytically about the initial stereotypical response (Pennycook, Cheyne, 
Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2014a). Stanovich (e.g., 2004; 2009b) has argued that thinking 
disposition is an underappreciated determinant of psychological outcomes. Recent research has 
supported the idea that cognitive style plays a consequential role in psychological domains that 
are of some general import (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015b): e.g., creativity (Barr, 
Pennycook, Stolz, & Fugelsang, 2014), moral judgments and values (Paxton, Unger, & Greene, 
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2012; Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2014b; Rozyman, Landy, & Goodwin, 
2014), religious belief (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2014a; Pennycook, 
Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2013; Pennycook et al., 2012; Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & 
Fugelsang, 2016; Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012), bullshit receptivity (Pennycook, Cheyne, 
Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015), and even Smartphone technology use (Barr, Pennycook, 
Stolz, & Fugelsang, 2015). The research indicating that individual differences in cognitive style 
have important effects on beliefs and behaviour implies that the engagement of Type 2 reasoning 
processes involves an important dispositional component. Cognitive style has particular 
relevance for the current discussion as it represents an independent top-down source of Type 2 
processing. That is, how much someone values or enjoys analytic thinking may contribute to the 
probability that they engage Type 2 process, independent of any Type 1 output monitoring 
process and therefore regardless of the content of the stimulus. 
The foregoing highlights an additional source of uncertainty about the factors that elicit 
Type 2 processing; namely, do individual differences relate to conflict detection? Recently, De 
Neys and Bonnefon (2013) theoretically integrated research on conflict detection with individual 
differences in reasoning. Specifically, they asked the question “do biased and unbiased reasoners 
take different paths early on in the reasoning process or is the observed variance late to arise?” 
(p. 172). The answer to this question has significant implications: If individual differences only 
affect reasoning at a relatively late stage (Stage 3 in my model), as De Neys and Bonnefon claim, 
it would imply that the influence of said individual differences has been greatly overemphasised 
in the reasoning and decision making literature. To support this argument, De Neys and 
Bonnefon cited the many cases where even “biased” reasoners appeared to have detected 
reasoning conflicts, with respect to both RT increases for incongruent base-rate problems (De 
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Neys & Glumicic, 2008), and many other types of problems and measures (De Neys, 2012). 
These findings suggest that “biased” and “unbiased” reasoners diverge late in the reasoning 
process, thereby suggesting that both types of reasoners are likely closer in cognitive function to 
each other than some may have previously considered5.  
However, while the research cited by De Neys and Bonnefon (2013) does indeed indicate 
that both biased and unbiased reasoners are able to detect the conflict between base-rates and 
stereotypes, for example, little research has directly compared reasoners based on the extent of 
Type 2 processing increase as a function of conflict detection (but see Pennycook et al, 2014a). 
Do relatively intuitive individuals (i.e., those who are relatively biased) engage in comparable 
levels of Type 2 processing in the face of conflict as reflective individuals? While it may be the 
case that intuitive people are able to efficiently detect conflict during reasoning, as suggested by 
De Neys and Bonnefon, it may also be the case that this conflict detection does not engender 
much Type 2 processing relative to more analytic individuals. This is an open question that 
speaks directly to the extent of cognitive processing differences that arise as a function of 
individual differences. 
Current Work 
 The utility of dual-process theory is tied largely to the ability to predict when Type 2 
processing will be engaged. Here, I have developed a three-stage model of reasoning and applied 
it to an illustrative class of reasoning problems. Although the model is consistent with a 
                                                          
5 The use of the term “bias” here refers to participants who scored lower (relatively “biased”) or 
higher (relatively “unbiased”) than the median on the given reasoning task (De Neys, 2012). As 
such, relative bias level, as used by De Neys and colleagues, does not map directly onto either 
cognitive ability or style. Indeed, given that both style and ability are typically predictive of 
performance on the tasks used by De Neys and colleagues, “bias” likely reflects a combination of 
both, depending on the task.      
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relatively large body of extant research, there are a number of components that must be 
empirically tested. Here I investigate two core claims derived from the model: 1) Conflict 
detection is a key determinant of analytic engagement, but sometimes fails, and 2) Conflict 
detection and cognitive decoupling (i.e., expending additional effort to override an intuitive 
response in lieu of an alternative) are dissociable sources of analytic thinking. Secondarily, I 
investigate whether responsiveness to conflicts is subject to individual differences.   
 To do this, I develop a paradigm that is suitable for reliably measuring subtle increases in 
Type 2 processing. This paradigm uses base-rate problems which, as outlined above, are of 
particular interest because they reliably elicit RT increases presumed to result separately from 
conflict detection and cognitive decoupling processes. To reiterate, participants spend more time 
on problems that contain a conflict between base-rate and stereotype relative to non-conflict 
control problems (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012). 
Importantly, this RT increase is evident for both stereotype (IR1) and base-rate (IR2) responses. 
As discussed, these RT increases should reflect different processes in the three-stage model. The 
RT increase for stereotypical responses relative to non-conflict problems is reflective of 
successful conflict monitoring because such cases reflect sensitivity to IR2 even when IR1 is the 
chosen response (De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008). Presumably, the additional time is used to 
rationalize IR1. In contrast, following previous research that indicates that stereotypical 
information is a highly salient source of intuitive responses (see Barbey & Sloman, 2007), the 
RT increase for base-rate responses relative to non-conflict problems should reflect the use of 
Type 2 processing to rethink or decouple from the initial stereotypical response (IR1), leading to 
the base-rate response (IR2). This process should take additional time because IR1 must be 
inhibited or suppressed in lieu of the alternative. 
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Response time is a crucial measure for the current purposes as my focus is on measuring 
relative increases in Type 2 processing as a function of conflict detection and decoupling. Given 
the presumption that Type 2 processing is typically slower and more resource demanding than 
Type 1 processing, longer RTs in an experimental condition are thought to reflect an increased 
level of Type 2 engagement (e.g., Thompson et al., 2011). However, RTs are also notoriously 
noisy. This is particularly true for typical base-rate problems as mean RTs typically range from 
10 to 25 seconds (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012). Thus, I 
developed a rapid-response version of the base-rate task wherein participants are presented with 
the individual components of traditional base-rate problems in succession (Pennycook et al., 
2014a). In lieu of the long stereotypical descriptions (see above example), participants are 
presented with a single trait (e.g., “kind”) that is strongly diagnostic of one group (e.g., nannies) 
but not the other (e.g., politicians). This allowed me to decrease extraneous variance due to 
reading times, increase reliability by including a relatively large number of items, and easily 
manipulate components of the items across conditions and experiments.  
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Experiment 1 
The goal of Experiment 1 was two-fold. First, it is necessary to establish the rapid-
response paradigm by replicating two key effects6. Specifically, participants should take longer 
for incongruent relative to congruent problems for both stereotypical responses (reflecting 
successful conflict detection) and base-rate responses (reflecting successful cognitive 
decoupling).  
In contrast to previous models, my three-stage model highlights the possibility that 
conflict detection may sometimes fail even if two Type 1 outputs are successfully cued by the 
stimulus. This is consistent with a recent experiment by Mevel et al. (2015), wherein 44% of the 
sample did not have decreased confidence for biased responses to conflict relative to non-conflict 
ratio bias problems. Thus, also the majority of the sample displayed some evidence that they 
recognized the inherent conflict in the ratio bias problems (thereby decreasing their confidence in 
their judgments), a sizable proportion of the sample may have failed to detect the conflict 
altogether. Indeed, those participants who apparently failed to detect the conflict had lower 
accuracy on the task and, among the participants who demonstrated a detection effect, there was 
a positive correlation between the size of the effect and accuracy. These findings suggest that 
categorical errors in conflict detection are not uncommon and play a role in biased responding. 
However, accuracy was quite high in their experiment, reaching well over 70% for the 
participants who ostensibly failed to detect the conflict. Biased responding is typically far more 
common for base-rate problems and, as a consequence, the rapid-response base-rate task should 
serve as a strong further test of potential conflict detection failure. Specifically, participants who 
                                                          
6 Although the rapid-response paradigm has been used in a previous study (Pennycook et al., 
2014a), the focus of that paper was on religiosity and the effects with respect to the base-rate task 
were not reported in detail. 
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are highly biased (as indexed by a large proportion of stereotypical responses) should be less 
likely to differentiate between congruent and incongruent base-rate problems, leading to an 
absence of a conflict detection effect (i.e., no RT increase for stereotypical responses to 
incongruent problems relative to congruent). If cases where there is no conflict detection effect 
are isolated primarily among participants who are highly biased, as opposed to randomly 
distributed throughout the sample, then I will be justified in calling these conflict detection 
failures and not just random noise in the sample.   
Method – Experiment 1 
Participants 
Sixty-two University of Waterloo undergraduates volunteered to take part in the study in 
return for partial course credit (16 male, 46 female, M age = 20.95, SD age = 5.46). A subset of this 
data was reported previously by Pennycook et al. (Experiment 3; 2014a). These data were not 
analyzed until the full sample was completed. All dependent variables relevant to my target 
research questions that were analyzed for this experiment are reported below. Participants also 
completed a religiosity measure in a separate session as a part of a mass-testing survey (see 
Pennycook et al., 2014a). All manipulations are reported in the method section.  
Materials 
 One-hundred thirty two items were created using a large online pretest. For this, 86 
University of Waterloo undergraduates (28 male, 58 female, M age = 20.6, SD age = 4.06) were 
given a list of 50 groups of people and asked to select 2 out of 30 personality traits (which was 
taken from a larger group of 60 total traits, counterbalanced across 2 conditions) that most 
strongly reflected the prototypical member of the group. The groups primarily consisted of 
different salient professions (e.g., clown, doctor, etc.) that were likely to be associated with 
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stereotypes. I also included select non-profession groups (i.e., men, women, girls, boys, rich 
people, poor people, 16 year olds, 50 year olds). The personality traits were well-known 
stereotypes (e.g., dishonest, punctual, tidy, etc.; see Novemsky & Kronzon, 1999 for a similar 
strategy). At the end of the pretest, participants were asked two follow-up questions and 
reminded that they will receive their credit regardless of how they respond. These two questions 
were: 1) Did you follow the instructions for the above survey, and 2) Did you answer the above 
questions randomly. In total, 7 participants who answered negatively for the first question and/or 
affirmatively for the second were excluded from further analysis.     
 To determine which groups were associated with opposing stereotypes, I transposed the 
data such that the rankings for each of the 60 personality traits were listed for each of the 50 
groups. I then investigated the correlations among groups and isolated the top 8 negative 
correlations for each group (for example, engineer shared opposing stereotypes with groups such 
as hippy, girl, and clown). I then created 66 sets of groups with opposing stereotypes with the 
goal of limiting repetition of groups across sets (i.e., each group was paired with more than one 
other group, but never more than three). Accompanying personality traits were selected based on 
relative ranking for groups in each set. So, for example, “kind” was selected by 18 participants 
for nanny and by 1 participant for politician whereas “dishonest” was selected by 20 participants 
for politician and by 0 participants for nanny. Finally, I created 2 items for each set using the 2 
personality traits, resulting in 132 items in total. However, each set was only presented once per 
block. For example, nanny and politician were paired with “kind” in the first block and 
“dishonest” in the second block. This allowed me to counterbalance congruency across blocks.  
 As in previous research (e.g., De Neys & Glumicic, 2008), I used three extreme base-rate 
probabilities an equal number of times across trials: 995/5, 996/4, 997/3. Participants received 66 
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congruent and 66 incongruent problems. Dependent measures included response time and the 
proportion of base-rate responses. For incongruent problems, response times for stereotype and 
base-rate responses were included as separate measures in order to index conflict detection and 
cognitive decoupling respectively.  
Procedure  
At the beginning of the experiment, participants read the following instructions:  
“In a big research project a large number of studies were carried out 
where short personality descriptions of the participants were made. In 
every study there were participants from two population groups (e.g., 
carpenters and policemen).”  
“In each study one participant was drawn at random from the sample. 
You’ll get to see a personality trait for this randomly chosen participant. 
You’ll also get information about the composition of the population 
groups tested in the study in question.  
You'll be asked to indicate to which population group the participant 
most likely belongs.” 
“Please answer the problems as quickly and accurately as possible. Once 
you’ve made up your mind you must enter your answer (‘a’ or ‘b’) 
[corresponding to ‘z’ and ‘m’ keys using stickers] immediately and then 
the next problem will be presented. 
Please feel free to ask any questions that you have.” 
Participants were then given specific information for each step of the procedure for a practice 
item. After completing 2 practice items, participants went through two blocks of 66 items each. 
The procedure for a single item can be seen in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. Procedure for rapid-response base-rate task.  
 
Results – Experiment 1 
Choice proportion for high base-rate alternative. One participant who only chose the 
response consistent with both base-rate and stereotype 42% of the time on congruent items was 
removed from analysis; all other participants scored 80% or higher and 90.2% of the sample 
scored 90% or higher on congruent items. For incongruent problems, the proportion of base-rate 
responses is the inverse of the proportion of stereotype responses (i.e., .44 base-rate responses = 
.56 stereotype responses). A large decrease in the proportion of base-rate responses was evident 
for incongruent relative to congruent items (see Table 1), t(60) = 11.66, SE = .04, p < .001, d = 
1.49.  
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  Choice Proportion 
  Congruent Incongruent 
Experiment 1 Extreme Base-Rates .97 (.05) .44 (.35) 
Experiment 2 
Moderate Base-Rates .96 (.04) .28 (.30) 
Extreme Base-Rates .98 (.03) .49 (.38) 
Note: Standard deviations are listed in brackets. 
Table 1. Mean choice proportion for high base-rate alternative as a function of problem type for 
Experiments 1 and 2. 
 
Response time. I analyzed both raw response times (RTs) and RTs following a conversion 
to log10. Outlying raw RT’s (3+ SD) were excluded prior to my calculation of RT (but not 
logRT) cell means, representing 1.9% of the data. RTs for congruent items that were inconsistent 
with both base-rate and stereotype were excluded from analysis (see De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; 
Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012 for a similar analytic procedure). As a result, RTs were 
entered into a repeated measures ANOVA with 3 levels (responses consistent with base-
rate/stereotype for congruent items, responses consistent with base-rate for incongruent items, 
responses consistent with stereotype for incongruent items). A total of 4 participants were not 
entered into the ANOVA as they gave only stereotypical responses (N = 3) or only base-rate 
responses (N = 1) for incongruent items and therefore did not contribute data to each cell of the 
design.  
There was a main effect of congruency on RT, F(1.3, 74.3) = 21.36, MSE = 222754.7, p 
< .001, ƞ2 = .28 (see Table 2) and logRT, F(1.2, 70.0) = 31.09, MSE = .04, p < .001, ƞ2 = .357. 
Planned follow-up t-tests revealed significant differences between congruent and incongruent 
                                                          
7 Values were adjusted using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction in this and the following 
experiments when the sphericity assumption was violated.  
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base-rate responses, t(59) = 7.65, SE = 70.41, p < .001, d = .99, and congruent and incongruent 
stereotype responses, t(57) = 5.72, SE = 68.27, p < .001, d = .75. Incongruent base-rate responses 
and incongruent stereotype responses did not significantly differ, t(56) = 1.41, SE = 115.66, p = 
.163, d = .19, though this analysis was marginal with logRT’s, t(57) = 1.99, SE = .05, p = .063, d 
= .25. These results indicate that the RT increase for incongruent relative to congruent items was 
evident for both base-rate and stereotypical responses, but that it tended to be somewhat larger 
for base-rate responses. These results closely match those found using traditional base-rate 
problems (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012). 
 
  Congruent Incongruent 
   Stereotypical Base-Rate 
Experiment 1 
Extreme Base-Rates 696 (38) 1095* (79) 1258* (84) 
Experiment 2 
Moderate Base-Rates 778 (60) 898* (137) 1470* (193) 
Extreme Base-Rates 787 (59) 1385* (135) 1504* (190) 
Note: * represents significance at a .05 level for the incongruent-congruent response time 
comparison. Standard error is listed in brackets. 
Table 2. Mean response time (in milliseconds) as a function of problem type and response (either 
consistent with stereotype or base-rate) for Experiments 1 and 2.  
Individual differences. Next I turn to the prediction that individual differences would 
reveal categorical failures in conflict detection. As an initial step, I correlated the proportion of 
base-rate responses for congruent and incongruent problems with several RT measures (see 
Table 3). The goal here is to investigate if there is an overall correlation between biased 
responding and RT for incongruent problems as a means to justify my isolation of potential 
categorical conflict detection failures. If there are cases of conflict detection failure, I expect 
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them to be associated with high levels of biased responding, which implies a positive correlation 
between RT for stereotypical responses and the proportion of base-rate responses (i.e., the 
inverse of biased responding). An alternative possibility is that cases where there is no difference 
between RT for stereotypical responses and the congruent baseline simply represent random 
noise in the sample and not genuine failures of conflict detection. Anything but a clear 
association between presumed detection failures and high levels of bias would support this 
possibility.   
Given the skew for raw RTs, I use the logRT difference scores for this analysis. As 
above, the participants who did not contribute data to every cell of the design (i.e., those who 
gave all base-rate or stereotypical responses) were excluded from analysis. Moreover, I included 
RT for base-rate responses in this analysis for completeness. The results can be found in Table 3.  
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Incongruent – Base-Rate Prop.  - .16 .04 .65 .84 -.52 -.70 
2. Congruent – Base-Rate Prop.  - -.09 .09 .21 -.06 < -.01 
3. Congruent RT   - .67 -.10 .61 -.02 
4. Incongruent Stereotype RT    - .68 .14 -.37 
5. Conflict Detection (RT diff)     - -.43 -.47 
6. Incongruent Base-Rate RT      - .78 
7. Cognitive Decoupling (RT diff)       - 
Table 3. Pearson product-moment correlations between the proportion of base-rate responses and RTs in Experiment 1. Base-Rate % 
= Proportion of base-rate responses. Conflict detection refers to the difference in RT between incongruent stereotypical responses and 
congruent items. Cognitive decoupling refers to the difference in RT between incongruent base-rate responses and congruent items. 
Coefficients in bold are significant, p < .05. N = 58.
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First, as expected, the proportion of base-rate responses for congruent problems did not 
correlate with any other measure. Moreover, RT for congruent problems was not associated with 
the proportion of base-rate responses for incongruent problems, though there was a significant 
correlation between RT for congruent and incongruent problems. These results indicate the RT 
for congruent problems is a good baseline, which is consistent with previous research 
(Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2014a). As a consequence, I 
subtracted the RT for congruent problems from the RTs for incongruent stereotypical and base-
rate responses8. The theorized increase in analytic processing due to conflict detection is indexed 
by the RT increase for incongruent stereotype responses relative to the congruent baseline 
whereas the theorized increase in analytic processing due to cognitive decoupling is indexed by 
the RT increase for incongruent base-rate responses relative to the congruent baseline (De Neys 
& Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012).  
The proportion of base-rate responses for incongruent problems was strongly positively 
correlated with RT for stereotypical responses to incongruent problems and strongly negatively 
correlated with RT for base-rates responses to incongruent problems. Moreover, these 
correlations increased in magnitude when RT for the congruent baseline was subtracted out to 
create the ‘conflict detection’ and ‘cognitive decoupling’ indices. These indices were also 
strongly negatively correlated. The scatterplots for the correlations between the proportion of 
base-rate responses to incongruent problems and the conflict detection and cognitive decoupling 
                                                          
8 To establish the reliability of these difference scores, I broke the trials up into 4 sets of 33 
observations (i.e., the randomized items for each of the 2 blocks were each split in half based on 
the order of presentation). The conflict detection effect across these 4 sets had good reliability (α 
= .71). The cognitive decoupling effect had acceptable reliability (α = .65).  
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effects are overlaid in Figure 3. Each unit of analysis in Figure 3 represents a participant (i.e., 
one circle and one triangle for each participant).  
 
Figure 3. Scatterplot of mean response time differences (log10) and the proportion of base-rate 
responses for incongruent problems in Experiment 1. Conflict detection refers to the difference 
in RT between incongruent stereotypical responses and congruent items. Cognitive decoupling 
refers to the difference in RT between incongruent base-rate responses and congruent items. 
Each unit of analysis represents a participant (i.e., one circle and one triangle for each 
participant). Lines show regression of RT difference scores (log10) on proportion of base-rate 
responses. 
Figure 3 allows for an inspection of the categorical failures of conflict detection. 
Specifically, there is a cluster of participants who gave a large majority of stereotypical 
responses and who did not spend any additional time (relative to the congruent baseline) doing 
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so. A post-hoc investigation of the conflict detection difference scores revealed that 10 out of 58 
participants (17.2%) had a negative raw RT difference between congruent and incongruent 
stereotypical responses (for a similar approach, see Mevel et al., 2015)9. Importantly, these 
participants were particularly biased in that they only responded according to the base-rate 5.8% 
of the time. This was more than 40% lower than the remainder of the sample (M = 48.7%), t(56) 
= 4.14, p < .001. I computed the error rate for congruent problems (i.e., selections inconsistent 
with both base-rate and stereotypes) for these participants (M = 5.4%) and there was no 
significant difference between congruent and incongruent problems, t < 1. Thus, not only did 
these participants show no evidence of conflict detection as measured by RT, but their responses 
revealed no influence of the base-rate information whatsoever. These data indicate that the most 
biased subset of the sample may have largely failed to detect the conflict between base-rate and 
stereotype.  Indeed, they may have been particularly biased precisely because the conflict failed 
to cue analytic thinking.  
Despite these findings, it should be noted that 82.8% of the sample had a positive RT 
difference between congruent and incongruent problems for stereotypical answers (ranging from 
5 to 2323 milliseconds). Note, however, that this is a liberal estimate of the proportion of the 
sample who successfully detected the conflict between base-rates and stereotypes as it includes 
individuals with very small overall effects. For example, 14 participants (24.1%) had a RT 
difference that was 100 ms or less, and these participants also had a low proportion of base-rate 
responses (M = 13.1%) relative to the overall mean of 44% (see Table 1). Nonetheless, even if 
this group is assumed to not have successfully detected the conflict, the majority of the sample 
                                                          
9 I used raw RT instead of logRT difference scores for this analysis because there is no concern 
for outliers (given the focus on the small and slightly negative difference scores) and the raw 
RTs are easier to interpret. 
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still remains (58.7%; incidentally, a number that closely matches Mevel et al., 2015). Thus, 
despite the variation in the conflict detection effect, there is evidence that the majority of the 
sample did increase Type 2 processing following successful conflict detection.  
Discussion – Experiment 1 
The results of Experiment 1 indicate that individual differences play a substantial role in 
the degree of Type 2 engagement following the presentation of conflicting information in a 
reasoning paradigm. Biased responding was associated with a smaller increase in RT for 
stereotypical responses to incongruent relative to congruent problems, potentially indicating that 
less biased individuals are more responsive to conflict (see also Pennycook et al., 2014a). 
Moreover, a non-trivial proportion of the sample (17.2%) actually took longer for congruent than 
incongruent problems and gave base-rate responses to incongruent problems at roughly the same 
rate (5.8%) as they gave the patently incorrect response to congruent problems (5.4%). This 
concordance between biased responding and categorical failures of conflict detection suggests 
that conflict detection is not perfectly efficient. However, this pattern of results was isolated to a 
minority of participants and, as a consequence, conflict detection failures of this type appeared to 
be relatively rare for this task.     
Somewhat surprisingly, less biased individuals actually took less time to respond than 
more biased individuals in cases where the stereotypical response was successfully overridden. 
To my knowledge, these results represent the first evidence that this association is not simply 
defined by an increase in RT among less biased individuals (see De Neys & Bonnefon, 2013). 
This may indicate that a lower level of biased responding is associated with efficiency in 
cognitive decoupling; in other words, that failures in decoupling (“inhibition failures”; see De 
Neys, 2012) are an important source of biased responding. There was no evidence that base-rate 
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responses are simply the result of a “guess” that results from having two equally intuitive 
choices. This finding is consistent with a recent set of experiments using syllogisms (e.g., “No 
fruits are sour, All lemons are fruits, Therefore, no lemons are sour.”). In these experiments 
Svedholm-Häkkinen (2015) replicated and extended the key finding from De Neys and 
Franssens (2009): i.e., that successfully inhibiting a belief-based intuitive response (i.e., 
decoupling) for conflict problems (using both syllogisms and base-rate problems) leads to 
impaired memory for the relevant belief on a later lexical decision task. Svedholm-Häkkinen 
found that particularly skilled participants (i.e., those high in cognitive ability and/or who have 
an analytic thinking disposition) did not show evidence of belief inhibition following a 
syllogistic reasoning task. This supports the idea that some reasoners may be particularly 
efficient at cognitive decoupling. 
Future research could isolate the underlying factors that determine decoupling efficiency 
in base-rate tasks such as the one employed here. Since cognitive decoupling requires both the 
inhibition of the initial response and a search for alternatives (Stanovich, 2009a; Stanovich & 
West, 2008), it is often strongly related to individual differences in fluid intelligence (e.g., 
Unsworth & Engle, 2005; 2007). Given this work, one possibility is that cognitive ability 
contributes to the suppression of stereotypical responses in lieu of base-rate responses. However, 
it is important to keep in mind that the increases in analytic processing that are being probed in 
the rapid-response base-rate paradigm are small. The increase in time spent for base-rate 
responses to incongruent relative to congruent problems was 562 milliseconds (see Table 2). 
This is a large increase in relative terms (participants take almost twice as long for incongruent 
relative to congruent problems), but the task of decoupling from the intuitive stereotype is only 
so complex as to require around half a second to complete. Also, it is possible that the efficiency 
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of cognitive decoupling in this task relates to higher levels of statistical knowledge (i.e., having 
sufficient mindware to easily override the stereotypical response) or less intuitive stereotypical 
responses (i.e., intuitive responses cued by stereotypes are less compelling and therefore easier to 
override). Though the foregoing does not bear directly on the proposed three-stage model as a 
general account of analytic engagement, it is nonetheless an interesting area for future research 
on base-rate neglect.  
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Experiment 2 
 In Experiment 1, I used the rapid-response base-rate task to replicate a set of key results. 
Moreover, I found evidence that particularly biased participants may be biased, in part, because 
they failed to detect the conflict between base-rates and stereotypes. Finally, further investigation 
of the correlation between the proportion of base-rate responses and the conflict detection and 
cognitive decoupling effects seemed to reveal a dissociation between these two potential sources 
of analytic thinking. That is, biased responding was associated with small conflict detection 
effects and large cognitive decoupling effects. However, this result should be interpreted with 
caution as it may be the case that some people enter the experiment with a stronger or weaker 
bias toward stereotypes or base-rates and, as a consequence, they simply respond faster with their 
dominant response10. Thus, in the next experiment, I look to test this dissociation experimentally. 
 As discussed above, Pennycook, Fugelsang, and Koehler (2012) found that the 
probability of conflict detection (as indexed by RT increases for stereotypical responses) for 
traditional base-rate problems is substantially diminished when base-rates are moderate (e.g., 
70/30) relative to when they are extreme (e.g., 995/5). Indeed, there was no evidence of conflict 
detection whatsoever in any of the three experiments that did not include extreme base-rates. 
Although the comparison was across experiments, this could be thought of as the first reported 
manipulation of conflict detection in a reasoning paradigm. Crucially, there was a significant RT 
increase for base-rate responses to incongruent problems relative to congruent in all five 
experiments, indicating that cognitive decoupling was not affected by base-rate extremity. There 
was no cross-experiment test comparing the extent of the increase, however, so this can only be 
considered preliminary evidence that conflict detection and cognitive decoupling are separable 
                                                          
10 I would like to thank Jonathan Evans for alerting us to this possibility.  
35 
 
sources of increases in Type 2 processing. As such, I introduced base-rate extremity as a 
manipulation in Experiment 2.  
 As in Experiment 1, I will also investigate the correlation between proportion of base-rate 
responses and the RT increases that I have attributed to conflict detection and cognitive 
decoupling processes. Bias susceptibility should be positively correlated with RT for 
stereotypical responses (conflict detection) and negatively correlated with RT for base-rate 
responses (decoupling) for both moderate and extreme base-rates. However, the proportion of 
categorical failures of conflict detection should be higher for moderate than extreme base-rates.  
Method – Experiment 2 
Participants 
Sixty University of Waterloo undergraduates volunteered to take part in the study in 
return for partial course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to a moderate (6 male, 24 
female, M age = 19.2, SD age = 1.4) or an extreme (6 male, 24 female, M age = 20.1, SD age = 2.6) 
base-rate condition. These data were not analyzed until the full sample was completed. All 
dependent variables that were analyzed for this experiment are reported below and all 
manipulations are reported in the method section (see Footnote 6). 
Materials and Procedure 
 The materials and procedure were identical to Experiment 1 with the exception that half 
of the participants were given base-rate problems with moderate base-rates. I used three 
moderate base-rate probabilities an equal number of times across trials: 700/300, 710/290, 
720/28011.  
                                                          
11 Pennycook, Fugelsang, and Koehler (2012) used moderate base-rates with similar probabilities 
(i.e., ~70%), but on a different scale (i.e., 70/30 instead of 700/300). Theoretically, this should 
not make a difference. To test this assumption I also included two additional moderate base-rate 
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Results – Experiment 2 
Choice proportion for high base-rate alternative. All participants chose the response 
consistent with both base-rate and stereotype for congruent problems more than 80% of the time. 
I entered the proportion of base-rate responses into a 2 (Congruency: incongruent, congruent) x 2 
(Extremity: moderate, extreme) mixed ANOVA (see Table 1). There was a large overall 
decrease in proportion of base-rate responses for incongruent relative to congruent items, F(1, 
58) = 179.28, MSE = .057, p < .001, ƞ2 = .76. There was also a between subject difference 
wherein the proportion of base-rate responses was lower for the moderate base-rate condition (M 
= .62) relative to the extreme base-rate condition (M = .74), F(1, 58) = 6.12, MSE = .062, p = 
.016, ƞ2 = .10, and an interaction between congruency and condition, F(1, 58) = 4.89, MSE = 
.057, p = .031, ƞ2 = .08, indicating that the difference between conditions was larger for 
incongruent relative to congruent items (see Table 1). 
Response time. As above, I analyzed both raw response times (RTs) and RTs following a 
conversion to log10. Outlying raw RT’s (3+ SD) were excluded prior to my calculation of cell 
means, representing 0.6% of the data. I entered the resulting RTs into a 3 (Congruency: 
incongruent base-rate, incongruent stereotype, congruent) x 2 (Condition: moderate, extreme) 
mixed ANOVA. A total of 5 participants were not entered into the ANOVA as they gave only 
stereotypical responses (N = 4) or only base-rate responses (N = 1) for incongruent items and 
therefore did not contribute data to each cell of the design. Mean RTs can be found in Table 2.  
                                                          
conditions (N = 60, 12 male, 48 female, M age = 20.0, SD age = 2.0): 7/3, 8/2 and 70/30, 71/29, 
72/28. As expected, these conditions did not differ from the reported moderate base-rate 
condition (i.e., 700/300, etc.) for any RT measure, all F’s < 1. Nor were there any differences in 
proportion of base-rate responses: incongruent, F < 1; congruent, F(2, 87) = 2.16, p = .122. I 
excluded these conditions from the primary analysis to facilitate exposition. 
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There was a main effect of congruency on RT, F(1.3, 68.9) = 17.11, MSE = 612984.5, p 
< .001, ƞ2 = .24 (see Table 2) and logRT, F(1.2, 65.9) = 34.71, MSE = .06, p < .001, ƞ2 = .39. 
There was no main effect of condition for either RT, F(1, 53) = 1.60, MSE = 810871.4, p = .212, 
ƞ2 = .03, or logRT, F(1, 54) = .25, MSE = .13, p = .622, ƞ2 < .01. However, there was a marginal 
interaction for RT, F(2, 106) = 2.49, MSE = 398458.1, p = .088, ƞ2 = .05, and significant 
interaction for logRT, F(2, 108) = 5.81, MSE = .033, p = .004, ƞ2 = .10. To further investigate 
this interaction, I computed the two RT difference scores in the same manner as in Experiment 1: 
1) the difference between RTs for incongruent stereotypical and congruent, and 2) the difference 
between RTs for incongruent base-rate and congruent12.    
As is evident from Table 2, the difference between the size of the RT difference between 
stereotypical responses to incongruent problems and congruent (control) problems was, as 
predicted, larger when participants were presented with extreme base-rates relative to moderate 
ones, RT: t(54) = 3.29, SE = 146.5, p = .002, d = .88, logRT: t(54) = 3.25, SE = .04, p = .002, d = 
.87. There was no between subject difference for the cognitive decoupling effect, RT: t(57) = .13, 
SE = 225.1, p = .895, logRT: t(58) = 1.32, SE = .06, p = .191. This finding replicates the pattern 
of results found by Pennycook, Fugelsang, and Koehler (2012). However, in contrast to that 
experiment, all RT difference scores in the current experiment were greater than zero, all t’s 
>2.8, all p’s < .01. This indicates that participants in the moderate base-rate condition were, on 
the aggregate, able to successfully detect the conflict in the rapid-response version of the task, 
albeit, as noted above, the overall responsiveness to conflict was lower for moderate than with 
                                                          
12 I ran the same reliability analysis as in Experiment 1 (see Footnote 8). The conflict detection 
effect had acceptable reliability in the moderate base-rate condition (α = .63) and good reliability 
in the extreme base-rate condition (α = .76). The cognitive decoupling effect had good reliability 
in the moderate base-rate condition (α = .78) and acceptable reliability in the extreme base-rate 
condition (α = .67). 
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extreme base-rates. This may reflect greater sensitivity for the rapid response task or it may be a 
result of the much larger number of items in the new task relative to previous versions.  
Individual differences. I correlated the proportion of base-rate responses with my RT 
measures separately for the two conditions. As in Experiment 1, I correlated the RTs after log10 
conversion and excluded participants who gave all base-rate or all stereotypical responses. As is 
evident from Table 4, the results from Experiment 1 were replicated in the extreme base-rate 
condition (below-diagonal of Table 4) and extended in the moderate base-rate condition (above-
diagonal of Table 4). The conflict detection effect was strongly positively correlated with the 
proportion of base-rate responses for both moderate (r = .82) and extreme (r = .77) base-rates, 
and the cognitive decoupling effect was strongly negatively correlated with the proportion of 
base-rate responses for both moderate (r = -.55) and extreme (r = -.84) base-rates. Moreover, 
inspection of the scatterplots (see Figure 4) reveals that the decreased proportion of base-rate 
responses in the moderate condition (Moderate = .28; Extreme = .49; see Table 1) may be 
partially accounted for by an increased number of participants who failed to detect the conflict 
between base-rates and stereotypes. The conflict detection difference scores (using raw RT) 
revealed that, in the moderate base-rate condition, 8 out of 28 participants (28.6%) had a 
negative RT difference between congruent and incongruent stereotypical responses (Mean 
proportion of base-rate responses = 6.2%). A further 12 participants (42.9%) in the moderate 
condition had a positive conflict detection effect that was smaller than 100 ms (Mean proportion 
of base-rate responses = 17%), indicating that the majority of the sample (71.5%) either had a 
negative or very slightly positive conflict detection effect. In the extreme base-rate condition, 5 
out of 28 participants (17.9%) had a negative RT difference (Mean proportion of base-rate 
responses = 11%) and 5 (17.9%) had a positive difference that was less than 100 ms (Mean 
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proportion of base-rate responses = 11.3%). Thus, in contrast to the moderate base-rate condition 
and consistent with Experiment 1, the majority of the sample (64.2%) had a positive conflict 
detection effect that was reasonably robust. This difference was significant using a Chi-Square 
analysis, χ2(1, N = 56) = 7.18, p = .007. Although 100 ms is an arbitrary cut off, these results 
nonetheless suggest that the overall decrease in the conflict detection effect for moderate relative 
to extreme base-rates may at least be partially the result of categorical conflict detection failures.  
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 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Incongruent – Base-Rate Prop.  - -.03 -.17 .29 .82 -.56 -.55 
2. Congruent – Base-Rate Prop. .18 - -.03 .09 .04 .11 .16 
3. Congruent RT .11 -.10 - .84 -.21 .61 .16 
4. Incongruent Stereotype RT .59 < .01 .74 - .34 .28 -.16 
5. Conflict Detection (RT diff) .77 .13 .10 .75 - -.41 -.36 
6. Incongruent Base-Rate RT -.47 -.19 .74 .29 -.33 - .88 
7. Cognitive Decoupling (RT diff) -.84 -.17 .04 -.37 -.63 .71 - 
Table 4. Pearson product-moment correlations between the proportion of base-rate responses and RTs in Experiment 2. Correlations 
for the moderate base-rate condition are displayed on the above-diagonal. Correlations for extreme base-rate condition are displayed 
on the below-diagonal. Base-Rate Prop = Proportion of base-rate responses. Conflict detection refers to the difference in RT between 
incongruent stereotypical responses and congruent items. Cognitive decoupling refers to the difference in RT between incongruent 
base-rate responses and congruent items. Coefficients in bold are significant, p < .05. N = 28 (in each condition). 
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Figure 4. Correlations between mean response time differences (log10) and the proportion of base-rate responses for incongruent 
problems in Experiment 2. Conflict detection refers to the difference in RT between incongruent stereotypical responses and 
congruent items. Cognitive decoupling refers to the difference in RT between incongruent base-rate responses and congruent items. 
Each unit of analysis represents a participant (i.e., one circle and one triangle for each participant). Lines show regression of RT 
difference scores (log10) on proportion of base-rate responses. 
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Discussion – Experiment 2 
 Participants took longer for stereotypical responses to incongruent relative to congruent 
problems in both the extreme and moderate base-rate conditions; however, the extent of this 
difference was substantially smaller in the latter case (i.e., 120 ms for moderate compared to 598 
ms for extreme; see Table 2). In contrast, base-rate extremity had no effect on the RT increase 
for base-rate responses to incongruent relative to congruent problems (i.e., 692 ms for moderate 
compared to 717 ms for extreme; see Table 2). Thus, as hypothesized, extreme base-rate 
probabilities appeared to have increased the responsiveness to cognitive conflict without 
affecting cognitive decoupling. This increased the amount of time spent rationalizing the initial 
stereotypical response (IR1) following successful conflict detection, but had no effect on the 
amount of time taken to override it in lieu of the base-rate response (IR2). This serves as an 
initial justification of my separation of these components in the three-stage model.  
There was also evidence for increased conflict detection failures among relatively more 
biased participants, particularly when given moderate base-rates. It appears that failures of 
conflict detection are, at the very least, not uncommon. Further, replicating Experiment 1, the 
conflict detection effect was larger for less biased relative to more biased individuals; a finding 
that held for both moderate and extreme base-rates. I should reiterate, however, that these results 
should be interpreted with caution as the current experiment cannot rule out the possibility that 
participants enter the experiment with a differential predisposition toward stereotype or base-rate 
information. Note, however, that this explanation cannot account for the effect of base-rate 
extremity on RT increases for stereotypical responses (conflict detection), nor the lack of this 
effect for base-rate responses (decoupling). This finding is somewhat counterintuitive as 
manipulating the base-rates selectively affected RT for stereotypical responses; a finding 
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difficult to interpret without appealing to the possibility that extreme base-rates facilitate conflict 
detection specifically.  
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Experiment 3 
 The goal of Experiment 3 was to extend Experiments 1 and 2 in two important ways. The 
first relates to my use, as per De Neys and colleagues (e.g., De Neys, Moyens, & 
Vansteenwegen, 2010), of the proportion of base-rate responses to index bias susceptibility. This 
analysis strategy has the benefit of allowing me to map my results directly on to previous 
predictions made about conflict detection (e.g., De Neys & Bonnefon, 2013). However, as 
discussed above, individual differences in cognitive style, in particular, have specific relevance 
for my three-stage model because cognitive style can be considered an independent top-down 
source of Type 2 engagement. The first goal of Experiment 3, therefore, was to investigate 
whether there is a specific association between the willingness to engage Type 2 processing and 
Type 2 processing following conflict detection by including a self-report measure of thinking 
disposition.  
There is some preliminary evidence for such an association. Pennycook et al. (2014a) 
found a positive correlation between the degree of RT increase for stereotypical responses to 
incongruent relative to congruent problems and both self-report (i.e., the Actively Open-minded 
Thinking questionnaire; see their Experiment 1) and performance-based (i.e., the Cognitive 
Reflection Test; see their Experiment 2) measures of cognitive style. However, the authors used 
traditional base-rate problems with extreme base-rates. Here I employ the more reliable rapid-
response task and include moderate base-rates. If cognitive style is associated with increased 
responsiveness to conflict in particular, there should be an association between cognitive style 
and the RT increase for stereotypical responses (the “conflict detection effect”) but not the RT 
increase for base-rate responses (the “cognitive decoupling effect”). Moreover, the correlation 
between RT for stereotypical responses should be stronger for moderate relative to extreme base-
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rates. The underlying assumption here is that cases where cognitive decoupling requires 
relatively more Type 2 processing – as, for example, among more biased relative to less biased 
participants – are explained by greater difficulty suppressing or inhibiting the intuitive 
stereotypical response. Thus, it is a matter of capacity (e.g., processing speed, statistical 
knowledge), not disposition.  
The second goal of Experiment 3 was to manipulate the probability of conflict detection 
without altering the content of the items. Kahneman and Tversky’s (1973) single lawyer-
engineer problem was the basis of the base-rate neglect problems developed by De Neys and 
Glumicic (2008) to investigate conflict detection during reasoning. Although presenting 
participants with multiple versions of the same problem is necessary for this type of research, 
responsiveness to the conflict between base-rate and stereotype may increase as the number of 
problems increases (Kahneman, 2000; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Alternatively, it is 
possible that a large number of items may lead to habituation, thereby diminishing my effects13. 
Thus, I included base-rate extremity as a within-subject variable and varied the order of 
presentation between-subjects. This is a simple manipulation that should have powerful effects. 
Specifically, under the hypothesis that the responsiveness to cognitive conflict is facilitated by 
earlier detections within a problem set, RT for stereotypical responses to incongruent problems 
with moderate base-rates should increase if extreme base-rates are presented in an earlier block 
of trials. Indeed, presenting extreme base-rates prior to moderate base-rates should greatly 
diminish the base-rate extremity effect. In contrast, presenting moderate base-rates prior to 
extreme base-rates should have the opposite effect. That is, the switch from moderate to extreme 
should make the base-rates highly salient and greatly increase the responsiveness to conflict. As 
                                                          
13 I would like to thank Wim De Neys for alerting us to this possibility. 
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in Experiment 2, this manipulation should have no effect on the amount of time spent decoupling 
from the stereotypical response (i.e., RT for base-rate responses to incongruent problems will not 
differ between conditions).  
Method – Experiment 3 
Participants 
Seventy-four University of Waterloo undergraduates volunteered to take part in the study 
in return for partial course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to either the extreme first, 
moderate second condition (11 male, 26 female, M age = 20.5, SD age = 1.7) or the moderate first, 
extreme second condition (13 male, 24 female, M age = 20.5, SD age = 1.6). These data were not 
analyzed until the full sample was completed. All manipulations are reported in the method 
section. 
Materials and Procedure 
 The materials and procedure for the rapid-response task were identical to Experiment 2 
with the exception that base-rate extremity was manipulated within subject. Thus, in total, 
participants were given 264 items across two blocks, counterbalanced across condition. 
Participants were given a thinking disposition questionnaire consisting of 18 items from 
the Need for Cognition scale (NFC: Cacioppo et al., 1996) and 41 items from the Actively Open-
Minded Thinking scales (AOT: Stanovich & West, 2007), presented in a randomly intermixed 
order. The scales included questions such as “I usually end up deliberating about issues even 
when they do not affect me personally” (NFC) and “changing your mind is a sign of weakness” 
(AOT, reverse scored). The overall thinking disposition score was obtained by summing the 
responses across all items. Each item was scored such that higher scores represented a greater 
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tendency toward analytic thinking. The full scale had good internal consistency: Cronbach’s α = 
.9114. 
Results – Experiment 3 
Choice proportion for high base-rate alternative. Five participants who chose the 
response consistent with both base-rate and stereotype for congruent problems less than 80% of 
the time were excluded from further analysis (4 when base-rates were moderate and 1 when 
base-rates were extreme). I entered the proportion of base-rate responses into a 2 (Congruency: 
incongruent, congruent) x 2 (Extremity: moderate, extreme) x 2 (Condition: moderate first, 
extreme first) mixed ANOVA (Table 5). There was a decrease in the proportion of base-rate 
responses for incongruent relative to congruent items, F(1, 67) = 148.54, MSE = .11, p < .001, ƞ2 
= .69. There was also a within subject difference wherein the proportion of base-rate responses 
was lower for moderate base-rates relative to extreme base-rates, F(1, 67) = 44.49, MSE = .014, 
p < .001, ƞ2 = .40, and an interaction between congruency and extremity, F(1, 67) = 42.90, MSE 
= .012, p < .001, ƞ2 = .39, indicating that the difference between moderate and extreme base-
rates was larger for incongruent relative to congruent items.  
 Moderate First Extreme First  
 Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent 
Moderate .96 (.04) .35 (.34) .96 (.05) .41 (.37) 
Extreme .97 (.05) .65 (.37) .97 (.05) .48 (.36) 
Note: Standard deviations are listed in brackets. 
Table 5. Mean choice proportion for high base-rate alternative as a function of problem type and 
condition for Experiment 3. 
 
                                                          
14 I also analyzed the correlations separately for the NFC and AOT scales. The results were 
similar for both scales, though, as one would expect, the correlation coefficients were typically 
smaller than for the full scale.  
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There was no between subject difference in overall proportion of base-rate choices and 
no congruency by order condition interaction, both F’s < 1. However, order condition did 
interact with extremity, F(1, 67) = 15.43, MSE = .014, p < .001, ƞ2 = .19, and there was a three-
way interaction between congruency, extremity, and condition, F(1, 67) = 17.13, MSE = .012, p 
< .001, ƞ2 = .20. As is evident from Table 5, the source of this interaction appears to be a 30% 
increase in base-rate responses for extreme relative to moderate items in the moderate first 
condition. To investigate this possibility, I computed a difference score between moderate and 
extreme items for incongruent problems. An independent samples t-test verified that the 
difference between moderate and extreme base-rate items was substantially larger when 
moderate base-rate items were presented before extreme base-rate items, t(67) = 4.09, SE = .05, 
p < .001, d = .99. This suggests that the extreme base-rates were made particularly salient when 
preceded by moderate base-rates, leading participants to actually select the base-rate alternative 
at a nominally higher rate than the stereotypical option.    
Response time. I analyzed both raw response times (RTs) and RTs following a conversion 
to log10. Outlying raw RT’s (3+ SD) were excluded prior to my calculation of cell means, 
representing 0.9% of the data. I analyzed the data using the same RT difference scores that were 
computed in Experiments 1 and 2 (see Table 6 for mean RTs).  
Order  
Condition 
Base-Rate 
Extremity 
Congruent Incongruent 
 Stereotypical Base-Rate 
Moderate-Extreme Moderate 840 (64) 1065 (148) 1215 (155) 
Moderate-Extreme Extreme 714 (72) 1291 (169) 1068 (167) 
Extreme-Moderate Moderate 624 (64) 862 (148) 1010 (155) 
Extreme-Moderate Extreme 811 (72) 1167 (169) 1305 (167) 
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Note: Standard error is listed in brackets. 
Table 6. Mean response time (in milliseconds) as a function of problem type, response (either 
consistent with stereotype or base-rate), base-rate extremity, and order for Experiment 3. 
Dependent variables were entered into separate 2 (Extremity: moderate, extreme) x 2 
(Condition: moderate first, extreme first) mixed design ANOVAs. Thirteen participants were not 
included in the ANOVA because they did not give any stereotypical responses (5 for extreme 
base-rates, 3 for moderate base-rates, and 5 for both). Replicating Experiment 2, the RT 
difference between stereotypical responses to incongruent problems and congruent problems 
(i.e., conflict detection) was marginally larger for extreme base-rates relative to moderate ones 
for RT, F(1, 54) = 3.96, MSE = 369163.4, p = .052, ƞ2 = .07, and significantly larger for logRT, 
F(1, 54) = 10.10, MSE = .03, p = .002, ƞ2 = .16. There was no between subject effect of order 
condition for either RT or logRT, F’s < 1. Curiously, there was no interaction between extremity 
and order condition for RTs, F(1, 54) = .70, MSE = 369163.4, p = .406, ƞ2 = .01, but a significant 
interaction for logRTs, F(1, 54) = 5.00, MSE = .03, p = .029, ƞ2 = .09. Further inspection of the 
mean RTs revealed four outliers (3 SDs); two for extreme and two for moderate. With the 
outliers removed, the interaction between extremity and condition was robust for RT, F(1, 51) = 
10.29, MSE = 108911.6, p = .002, ƞ2 = .17. This also led to a more robust main effect for RT, 
F(1, 51) = 19.36, MSE = 108911.6, p < .001, ƞ2 = .28. As is clear from Table 7, the RT 
difference for stereotypical responses was much larger for extreme base-rates than moderate 
base-rates if moderate base-rates were presented first, RT (outliers removed): t(26) = 4.28, SE = 
113.9, p < .001, d = .82; logRT (no outliers removed): t(27) = 2.94, SE = .06, p = .007, d = .56. 
When extreme base-rates were presented first, there was no difference between moderate and 
extreme base-rates, RT (outliers removed): t(25) = 1.38, SE = 55.4, p = .180, d = .27; logRT (no 
outliers removed): t(27) = 1.21, SE = .02, p = .236, d = .23. This finding indicates that presenting 
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participants with extreme base-rates prior to moderate ones increases the responsiveness to 
conflict for moderate base-rates. In contrast, conflict detection sensitivity for moderate base-rates 
was very modest when they were presented first15. Moreover, it appears that switching from 
moderate to extreme base-rates made the base-rates highly salient, leading to a very robust 
conflict detection effect.    
 Conflict Detection  Cognitive Decoupling 
 Moderate First Extreme First  Moderate First Extreme First 
Moderate Base-Rates 86 (57) 121 (58)  306 (96) 310 (78) 
Extreme Base-Rates 574 (114) 197 (116)  284 (106) 409 (108) 
Note: Standard error is listed in brackets. 
Table 7. Mean response time difference (in milliseconds) as a function of problem type and 
condition for Experiment 3. Conflict Detection refers to the difference in RT between 
incongruent stereotypical responses and congruent items. Cognitive Decoupling refers to the 
difference in RT between incongruent base-rate responses and congruent items. 
The RT difference between incongruent base-rate responses and congruent items (i.e., 
cognitive decoupling) did not differ as a function of base-rate extremity or condition for either 
RT or logRT, all F’s < 1. Nor was there an interaction between extremity and condition for either 
RT or logRT, all F’s < 1 (see Table 7). 
Individual differences. Correlations between analytic thinking disposition and major 
variables are presented in Table 8. Given the skew for raw RTs, I use the logRT difference 
scores for this analysis. The logRT difference score for stereotypical responses was positively 
correlated with thinking disposition indicating that more analytic participants demonstrated a 
                                                          
15 The RT difference between stereotypical responses to incongruent problems and congruent 
problems (i.e., conflict detection) was only marginally different from 0 for moderate base-rates 
in the moderate first condition, RT (outliers removed): t(30) = 1.92, SE = 51.3, p = .064, d = .35; 
logRT (no outliers removed): t(31) = 1.87, SE = .04, p = .07, d = .33.  
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higher level of conflict detection. This correlation was significant when base-rates were 
moderate (r = .28, p = .03, N = 60) but not when base-rates were extreme (r = .20, p = .139, N = 
57), although this difference between correlations was not significant by a William’s test (t = 
0.54, p = .59). Future research could investigate whether differences in thinking disposition are 
more important under conditions where the conflict between cognitive outputs is less salient. 
Finally, logRT difference scores for base-rate responses did not correlate with thinking 
disposition, although the correlation coefficients were negative. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Thinking Disposition - .26 -.16 .28 -.18 .20 -.11 
2. Conflict Detection (Overall)  - -.30 .87 -.26 .72 -.24 
3. Cognitive Decoupling (Overall)   - -.23 .72 -.30 .89 
4. Conflict Detection (Moderate)    - -.21 .35 -.21 
5. Cognitive Decoupling (Moderate)     - -.19 .50 
6. Conflict Detection (Extreme)      - -.23 
7. Cognitive Decoupling (Extreme)       - 
 
Table 8. Pearson product-moment correlations between thinking disposition score and RT difference scores. Thinking disposition = 
sum of the Actively Open-minded Thinking scale and the Need for Cognition scale. Conflict Detection refers to the difference in RT 
between incongruent stereotypical responses and congruent items. Cognitive Decoupling refers to the difference in RT between 
incongruent base-rate responses and congruent items. Coefficients in bold are significant, p < .05. N’s vary.  
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Discussion – Experiment 3 
 Participants who, based on a self-report measure of thinking disposition, are more likely 
to think analytically had a larger increase in RT for stereotypical responses to incongruent 
relative to congruent problems. This replicates previous work (Pennycook et al., 2014a) and 
extends the results of Experiments 1 and 2, thereby suggesting that individual differences play a 
role in the responsiveness to conflict. On its own, however, this finding does not rule out the 
possibility that analytic individuals simply spend more time thinking when given reasoning 
problems. There are three additional observations that support the conclusion that individual 
differences in cognitive style increase the responsiveness to cognitive conflicts in particular. 
First, the reported correlations were between thinking disposition and the difference between RT 
for incongruent and congruent problems. Thus, in essence, variation in the amount of time spent 
on congruent problems was controlled for in the analysis. This means that the reported 
association is specific to variation in RT for incongruent problems (indeed, thinking disposition 
did not correlate with RT for congruent problems, r < .01, p = .959). Second, thinking 
disposition was not correlated with RT for base-rate responses to incongruent problems (in fact, 
it was nominally negatively correlated, see Table 8). Thus, if anything, more analytic participants 
took less time to decouple from the intuitive stereotype. Third, the association between thinking 
disposition and RT for stereotypical responses was somewhat more apparent when base-rates 
were moderate relative to extreme. This is consistent with the hypothesis that individual 
differences in cognitive style should become more important in cases where the conflict is more 
difficult to detect.  
In Experiment 2, I successfully decreased the difference in RT between stereotypical 
responses for incongruent problems relative to congruent problems by changing the base-rates 
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from extreme (e.g., 995/5) to moderate (e.g., 700/300); an effect that was reported across 
experiments in earlier work (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012) and that replicated in 
Experiment 3. Moreover, in Experiment 3, I manipulated the order of presentation for moderate 
and extreme base-rates and, as predicted, this had an effect on the RT increase for stereotypical 
responses to incongruent relative to congruent problems. Specifically, presenting participants 
with extreme base-rates prior to moderate ones led to an increased RT difference for moderate 
base-rates, suggesting that earlier conflict detection for extreme base-rates facilitated later 
conflict detection sensitivity for moderate base-rates. Moreover, it appears that switching the 
base-rates from moderate to extreme base-rates led to a large increase in the RT difference for 
stereotypical responses, suggesting that the already salient extreme base-rates became even more 
salient when presented after moderate base-rates. This indicates that rationalization following 
successful conflict detection is not at ceiling when given a large number of extreme base-rates 
under standard conditions. 
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Experiment 4 
Thus far I have successfully diminished the RT increase for stereotypical responses that 
is thought to index conflict detection by manipulating the extremity (Experiments 2 and 3) and 
order (Experiment 3) of base-rate presentation. As predicted, these manipulations had no effect 
on the RT increase for base-rates responses that is thought to be reflective of increased Type 2 
processing due to cognitive decoupling. Moreover, individual differences in thinking disposition 
were positively correlated with RT for stereotypical responses but uncorrelated with RT for base-
rate responses. These findings indicate a clear dissociation between conflict detection and 
cognitive decoupling as alternative sources of analytic engagement. However, a stronger test 
would be to find a manipulation that increases one and decreases the other (or vice versa). This 
would be very compelling evidence for the functional independence of cognitive decoupling on 
one hand and conflict detection on the other.  
Previous research has shown that presenting base-rates after stereotypical information 
increases the likelihood and degree of base-rate use (Krosnick, Li, & Lehman, 1990). It is 
possible that including the base-rates as the last piece of information just prior to judgment (as 
was done in Experiments 1-3) increased conflict detection responsiveness. More specifically, if I 
assume that a given piece of information is at its most salient just prior to a decision point, 
presenting the base-rate just prior to the judgment in the rapid-response task should maximize the 
likelihood of recognition of a conflict with the previously presented stereotypes. Under this 
logic, presenting the base-rates before the stereotypes should make the conflict less salient, 
leading to a smaller RT difference between stereotypical responses to incongruent problems and 
congruent problems relative to when the base-rates are presented second. In terms of the three-
stage model, this manipulation can be seen as an attempt to maximize the probability that both 
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sources of Type 1 outputs (i.e., both IR1 and IR2) will enter the conflict monitoring module at 
similar times. With respect to cognitive decoupling, on the other hand, receiving the stereotypes 
after the base-rates should make them even harder to override, leading to a larger RT difference 
between base-rate responses to incongruent problems and congruent problems relative to when 
stereotypes are presented first (as in Experiments 1-3). In other words, successful cognitive 
decoupling (i.e., responding IR2) will take more time if IR1 is more salient.  
Method – Experiment 4 
Participants 
Eight-eight University of Waterloo undergraduates volunteered to take part in the study 
in return for partial course credit (23 male, 65 female, M age = 19.8, SD age = 1.7). Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of four conditions based on two between subject manipulations: 
1) Order: stereotype first or base-rate first; 2) Extremity: moderate or extreme base-rates. Given 
that the previous three experiments were run in the same participant pool, I added a question at 
the end of the experiment asking participants if they had seen similar problems before in 
previous studies (this included classic versions of base-rate problems that have also been 
included in multiple studies). In total, 17 participants answered this question affirmatively. 
However, as none of the subsequent analyses were meaningfully changed when they were 
excluded (apart from that which would be expected given the decrease in sample size) I retained 
the full sample of participants. These data were not analyzed until the full sample was 
completed. All dependent variables relevant to my target research questions that were analyzed 
for this experiment are reported below. All manipulations are reported in the method section. 
Materials and Procedure 
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 The materials and procedure for the rapid-response task were identical to Experiment 2 
with the exception that order of base-rates/stereotypes was manipulated between subjects.  
Results – Experiment 4 
Choice proportion for high base-rate alternative. All participants chose the response 
consistent with both base-rate and stereotype for congruent problems more than 80% of the time. 
I entered the proportion of base-rate responses into a 2 (Congruency: incongruent, congruent) x 2 
(Extremity: moderate, extreme) x 2 (Order: stereotype first, base-rate first) mixed ANOVA 
(Table 9). There was a decrease in proportion of base-rate responses for incongruent relative to 
congruent items, F(1, 84) = 257.60, MSE = .05, p < .001, ƞ2 = .75. As in Experiments 2 and 3, 
the proportion of base-rate responses was lower for moderate base-rates relative to extreme base-
rates, F(1, 84) = 4.16, MSE = .06, p = .045, ƞ2 = .05, and there was an interaction between 
congruency and extremity, F(1, 84) = 5.43, MSE = .05, p = .022, ƞ2 = .06, indicating that the 
difference between moderate and extreme base-rates was larger for incongruent relative to 
congruent items. There was no three-way interaction between congruency, extremity, and order, 
F < 1.     
 Stereotypes First Base-Rates First  
 Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent 
Moderate .97 (.03) .46 (.38) .95 (.03) .18 (.21) 
Extreme .96 (.05) .58 (.31) .96 (.05) .37 (.43) 
Note: Standard deviations are listed in brackets. 
Table 9. Mean choice proportion for high base-rate alternative as a function of problem type and 
condition for Experiment 4. 
 
Order had an effect on the overall proportion of base-rate choices, F(1, 84) = 10.72, MSE 
= .06, p = .002, ƞ2 = .11, indicating more base-rate selections when base-rates were presented 
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after stereotypes relative to when they were presented before. There was also a congruency by 
order interaction, F(1, 84) = 11.56, MSE = .05, p = .001, ƞ2 = .12. As with extremity, this 
indicates that the effect of order was primarily evident among incongruent items (see Table 9). 
Overall, the effect of order on performance for incongruent problems was quite striking. 
Presenting the base-rates prior to the stereotypes led to a 28% decrease in base-rate responses in 
the moderate condition and a 21% decrease in the extreme condition.  
Response time. I analyzed both raw response times (RTs) and RTs following a conversion 
to log10. Outlying raw RT’s (3+ SD) were excluded prior to my calculation of cell means, 
representing 0.8% of the data. Dependent variables were entered into a 2 (Extremity: moderate, 
extreme) x 2 (Order: stereotype first, base-rate first) x 3 (Congruency: responses consistent with 
base-rate/stereotype for congruent items, responses consistent with base-rate for incongruent 
items, responses consistent with stereotype for incongruent items) mixed design ANOVA. Seven 
participants were not included in the ANOVA because they did not give any stereotypical 
responses. Mean RTs can be found in Table 10.  
 
Presentation 
Order 
Base-Rate 
Extremity 
Congruent Incongruent 
 Stereotypical Base-Rate 
Stereotype first Moderate 683 (81) 944 (229) 1419 (264) 
Stereotype first  Extreme 809 (81) 1781 (229) 1268 (264) 
Base-rate first Moderate 959 (79) 1179 (224) 1715 (258) 
Base-rate first Extreme 844 (83) 1176 (235) 2062 (271) 
Note: Standard error is listed in brackets. 
Table 10. Mean response time (in milliseconds) as a function of problem type, response (either 
consistent with stereotype or base-rate), and condition for Experiment 4. 
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There was a main effect of congruency on RT, F(1.5, 110.7) = 17.35, MSE = 997027.6, p 
< .001, ƞ2 = .194 (see Table 10) and logRT, F(1.3, 103.6) = 37.91, MSE = .07, p < .001, ƞ2 = .33. 
There was no between-subject effect of presentation order for RT, F(1, 76) = 1.57, MSE = 
1127209.2, p = .214, ƞ2 = .03, but there was an effect for logRT, F(1, 77) = 6.02, MSE = .13, p = 
.016, ƞ2 = .07. However, there was an interaction between presentation order and congruency for 
both RT, F(2, 152) = 3.68, MSE = 726198.9, p = .028, ƞ2 = .05, and logRT, F(2, 154) = 5.21, 
MSE = .04, p = .007, ƞ2 = .06. In addition, there was a significant three-way interaction between 
presentation order, base-rate extremity, and congruency for RT, F(2, 152) = 3.09, MSE = 
726198.9, p = .048, ƞ2 = .04, though it was not significant for logRT, F(2, 154) = 1.12, MSE = 
.04, p = .331, ƞ2 = .01. All other analyses did not reach significance, all F’s < 1.88, all p’s > .17.    
To understand the interacting effects of presentation order, I computed the two RT 
difference scores (as in Experiments 1-3): i.e., the difference between RTs for incongruent 
stereotypical and congruent (conflict detection), and the difference between RTs for incongruent 
base-rate and congruent (cognitive decoupling; see Figure 5). I then ran a mixed ANOVA with 
response type (incongruent stereotype, incongruent base-rate) as a within-subject variable and 
both presentation order and base-rate extremity as between-subject variables. There was a main 
effect of response type, RT: F(1, 76) = 4.10, MSE = 1165181.7, p = .046, ƞ2 = .05, logRT: F(1, 
77) = 12.26, MSE = .08, p = .001, ƞ2 = .14, indicating a larger overall RT difference for base-rate 
responses (M = 792 ms) than stereotypical responses (M = 446 ms). Crucially, there was an 
interaction between response type and presentation order, RT: F(1, 76) = 4.58, MSE = 
1165181.7, p = .036, ƞ2 = .06, logRT: F(1, 77) = 5.96, MSE = .08, p = .017, ƞ2 = .07. There was 
also a marginal three-way interaction for RT, F(1, 76) = 4.58, MSE = 1165181.7, p = .054, ƞ2 = 
.05, however, it was not significant for logRT, F(1, 77) = 1.32, MSE = .08, p = .254, ƞ2 = .02, 
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and therefore will not be further considered. No other effects were significant, all F’s < 3.0, p’s ≥ 
.09.  
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Figure 5. Mean response time differences (in milliseconds) as a function of presentation order condition (i.e., stereotypes first or base-
rates first) for Experiment 4. Incongruent stereotype refers to the difference in RT between incongruent stereotypical responses and 
congruent items – the conflict detection effect. Incongruent base-rate refers to the difference in RT between incongruent base-rate 
responses and congruent items – the cognitive decoupling effect. 
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The interaction between presentation order and response type is depicted in Figure 5. 
Although all effects were greater than zero, all t’s > 2.6, p’s ≤ .011, indicating successful conflict 
detection and an RT increase due to cognitive decoupling in both presentation order conditions, 
as predicted, the order in which base-rates and stereotypes were presented had opposing effects 
on the RT differences for stereotype and base-rate responses. Whereas presenting the base-rate 
after the stereotype nominally increased RT for stereotypical responses (indicating an increase in 
conflict detection responsiveness when the less salient base-rate information is presented just 
before judgment), presenting the base-rate before the stereotype nominally increased RT for 
base-rate responses (indicating that presenting the intuitive stereotype just prior to judgment 
made it more difficult to inhibit). However, despite the significant interaction, the between-
subject comparison between presentation order conditions was largely non-significant: 
incongruent stereotype RT, F(1, 77) = 2.73, MSE = 893495.5, p = .103, ƞ2 = .03; incongruent 
stereotype logRT, F(1, 77) = 2.58, MSE = .05, p = .112, ƞ2 = .03, incongruent base-rate RT, F(1, 
83) = 2.54, MSE = 1085253.7, p = .115, ƞ2 = .03; incongruent base-rate logRT, F(1, 84) = 5.18, 
MSE = .08, p = .025, ƞ2 = .05. I was, on the other hand, able to successfully replicate the 
between-subject difference between extreme and moderate base-rates for incongruent stereotype 
RT, F(1, 77) = 3.95, MSE = 893495.5, p = .05, ƞ2 = .05 and logRT, F(1, 77) = 4.25, MSE = .05, p 
= .043, ƞ2 = .05. As in Experiments 2 and 3, base-rate extremity had no effect on RT for base-
rate responses, F’s < 1. 
Discussion – Experiment 4 
 Our three-stage model predicts that conflict detection and cognitive decoupling are 
distinct and separable sources of analytic engagement. In my final experiment I was able to 
doubly dissociate the RT increases that result from conflict detection and cognitive decoupling 
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by simply manipulating the presentation order of base-rate and stereotype information. This, 
along with the differential effects of base-rate extremity (Experiments 2 and 3) and individual 
differences (Experiment 3) reported earlier, represents strong evidence for these distinct sources 
of analytic engagement.  
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General Discussion 
  Bias is one of the most striking features of human cognition. The human mind evidently 
has immense intellectual capabilities – science and technology have, for example, been used to 
bring us to the moon and effectively abolish a great number of diseases. Given the achievements 
of the human race, it is perhaps reasonable to question the idea that our cognitive architecture is 
faulty in a fundamental way. And yet, despite the achievements, bias and irrationality also seem 
to confront us at every turn. People believe that the moon landing was an elaborate hoax and 
argue, rather dangerously, that vaccines lead to autism (Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 
2013). ‘Truthiness’ often seems to be as prevalent as truth. It seems self evident that, even with 
humanities great achievements, there is great value in determining the factors that underlie our 
biases. My goal with this line of studies was to speak to this question by investigating and 
elucidating integral features of human cognitive architecture. I have introduced a three-stage 
model of analytic engagement and, using experimental manipulation and individual differences, I 
have dissociated two of the integral components of the model: conflict detection and cognitive 
decoupling. Below I will further explicate the model and compare it to other perspectives by 
drawing on current and past data.   
The three-stage model of analytic engagement: Summary of current evidence 
My experiments speak to the utility of my three-stage model in three fundamental ways: 
1) I dissociated increases in Type 2 processing that indicate, on one hand, rationalization 
following successful conflict detection and, on the other hand, cognitive decoupling, 2) I found 
that conflict monitoring sometimes fails in predictable ways, and 3) I demonstrated that 
individual differences modulated conflict detection responsiveness. Specifically, making the 
base-rates moderate (e.g., 700 nurses and 300 doctors) instead of extreme (e.g., 995 nurses and 5 
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doctors) selectively decreased the conflict detection effect. This was evident both between 
subjects (Experiment 2) and within subjects (Experiment 3). The conflict detection effect, but not 
the cognitive decoupling effect, was also selectively affected by the order of extreme versus 
moderate base-rates in Experiment 3. Finally, changing the order of base-rate/stereotype 
presentation evidenced a double dissociation between conflict detection and cognitive 
decoupling. Namely, presenting base-rates prior to stereotypes led to a decrease in the conflict 
detection effect and an increase in the cognitive decoupling effect relative to the opposite 
orientation. 
In Experiments 1 and 2, the cases where participants did not appear to detect the conflict 
(i.e., a negative difference in RT between stereotypical responses to incongruent versus 
congruent problems) were limited to particularly biased participants. This indicates that some 
participants failed to detect the conflict between base-rates and stereotypes. Consistent with 
previous research (Pennycook et al., 2014a), analytic thinking disposition was positively 
correlated with the conflict detection effect and (nominally, but not significantly) negatively 
correlated with the cognitive decoupling effect – evidently, individual differences in active open-
mindedness is more consequential for increases in analytic processing attributable to 
rationalization following successful conflict detection than increases in analytic processing 
attributable to the active suppression of an intuitive response. 
Conflict detection failures  
Although the distinction between conflict detection and cognitive decoupling has not, 
until now, been formally built into a dual-process model, it is also not inconsistent with any 
current models. A more controversial dimension of my three-stage model relates to the potential 
for conflict detection failures. According to my model, it is possible for a conflict between two 
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intuitive outputs to be present and not detected. Further, I have claimed that this may occur in 
cases where a second initial response (IR2) comes to mind much less quickly and fluently than a 
first initial response (IR1). This account contrasts with earlier work where it has been claimed 
that conflict detection is highly efficient (e.g., De Neys, 2012; 2014).  
 Pennycook, Fugelsang, and Koehler (2012) provided the first evidence that conflict 
detection may not be as efficient as previously claimed. Specifically, there was no evidence of an 
overall conflict detection effect (as indexed by RT) when base-rates were made moderate instead 
of extreme. In Experiments 2-4 in the current manuscript, I employed this manipulation again but 
instead found evidence for conflict detection given moderate base-rates across each of the 
experiments. The conflict detection effect was larger for extreme than moderate base-rates, 
suggesting that participants were more responsive to conflict in the former case, but a question 
remains: Is there direct evidence for categorical failures of conflict detection?  
Following a recent analysis by Mevel et al. (2015), I isolated the proportion of 
participants who had actually took longer to respond to congruent problems than to give 
stereotypical responses to incongruent problems. By this very conservative analysis, 17.2-17.9% 
of the participants in Experiments 1 and 2 showed no evidence of detecting the conflict when 
given extreme base-rates. In Experiment 2, 28.6% of the participants in the moderate base-rate 
condition had a negative difference between congruent and incongruent problems. Importantly, 
these ostensible cases of categorical conflict detection failures were also associated with very 
low rates of base-rate responding (ranging from 5.8%-11% against overall means of 28%-49%). 
This indicates that these cases should not be attributed to random sampling error but are rather 
representative of a group of participants who, potentially, are highly biased precisely because 
they failed to detect the conflict between base-rates and stereotypes. These results clearly 
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illustrate that conflict detection is not perfectly efficient and, as a consequence, that detection 
failures are one source of biases in reasoning.  
Our three-stage model highlights two potential sources of detection failures: 1) no second 
(conflicting) initial response (IR2) is elicited, or 2) a second initial response is elicited, but the 
probability of conflict detection is dependent on the relative speed at which the competing initial 
responses come to mind. Although distinguishing between these possibilities empirically is 
outside the scope of this paper, it is worthwhile discussing how they can be accommodated in the 
model. Consider the difference between extreme and moderate base-rates, for example. If the 
first potential source is the explanation of the apparent detection failure reported by Pennycook, 
Fugelsang, and Koehler (2012), then extreme base-rates must cue initial responses and moderate 
base-rates must not. This would presume that the Type 1 process involved in autonomously 
recognizing and responding to base-rates is specific to extreme cases. This seems rather unlikely 
because the knowledge required for the base-rates to enter into judgment is a) rudimentary, with 
the ability to process probabilities having potential origins in childhood (Denison & Xu, 2014; 
Denison, Reed, & Xu, 2013; Xu & Denison, 2009) and b) equivalent regardless of base-rate 
extremity (i.e., the same normative standards hold for extreme and moderate base-rates). An 
alternative possibility is that the Type 1 process that responds to base-rates is less specific, but 
the speed at which the Type 1 outputs come to mind is nonetheless dependent on the extremity of 
the base-rate. A less efficient conflict monitoring system could be influenced by such a factor. 
Clearly, further work is necessary to better understand the nature of conflict monitoring in 
reasoning. This is one way in which the field could benefit from increased discussion of formal 
models of conflict detection and analytic engagement.  
Dual process theories and the problem of bias 
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Our three-stage model accommodates a more nuanced approach to the problem of bias 
than previous perspectives because it allows for both failures of analytic engagement and failures 
of response inhibition. These mechanisms are associated with two different – and often 
competing – dual-process explanations for the pervasiveness of bias in reasoning and decision 
making. The traditional dual-process view is that bias primarily results from a failure to 
sufficiently engage analytic reasoning mechanisms that might be used to override intuitive 
responses. This view is typically associated with Evans’ default-interventionist model which 
emphasizes the need for Type 2 processing to intervene against a default intuitive response (e.g., 
Evans, 2007; see also Stanovich, 2009a). Thompson’s metacognitive model also fits into this 
category as well, as it highlights the role of salient feelings of rightness that pre-empt Type 2 
processing (e.g., Thompson, 2009). These models assume that humans often fail to detect the 
need to engage the very processing that could potentially undermine bias (see De Neys, 2014 for 
further discussion).  
In contrast, De Neys suggests that bias results primarily from inhibition failures (e.g., De 
Neys, 2012). According to this less traditional view, participants successfully engage Type 2 
processing when the problem contains some sort of response conflict (i.e., they succeed at 
conflict detection), but simply fail to do so effectively (i.e., they fail at cognitive decoupling). 
Although De Neys (2014) has discussed potential boundary conditions of conflict detection, the 
discussed examples all included cases where the problem fails to cue a logical intuition. For 
example, the abstract Wason card selection task may not cue competing intuitive responses given 
its very low accuracy rates (see Wason & Evans, 1975). Participants may not develop the 
requisite knowledge to be able to solve such complex problems easily (i.e., barring an intuitive 
lure). However, such problems do not speak to the issue of conflict monitoring efficiency 
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because, based on the logical intuition model, if no logical intuitions are elicited by the problem 
there is simply no conflict to detect.  
 As clarified recently by De Neys (2014), a key question for this debate has to do with the 
modal biased reasoner (see also, Mevel et al., 2015). It may be that bias arises sometimes from 
failures of analytic engagement (Evans, 2007; Kahneman, 2003) and sometimes from inhibition 
failures (De Neys, 2012), perhaps depending on contextual or individual difference factors. The 
operative question, then, is which type of failure is more common? As discussed, failures of 
analytic engagement may be particularly influential given complex reasoning problems such as 
the Wason card selection task because the probability of competing intuitions is low. In the 
context of less complex reasoning and decision making problems, such as the one employed in 
this investigation, the bias exhibited by the modal reasoner appears to be more the result of 
inhibition failures (De Neys, 2012) than of outright failures of analytic engagement (Evans, 
2007). This is consistent with the wealth of evidence for successful conflict detection over a wide 
range of heuristic and biases tasks (see De Neys, 2012; 2014). Indeed, these results appear to be 
robust even when the analysis is isolated to the first item presented (e.g., De Neys, Rossi, & 
Houdé, 2013). One weakness of the literature, however, is that most investigations of conflict 
detection have focused entirely on the presence or absence of a significant overall conflict 
detection effect and therefore have not isolated the prevalence of categorical failures across 
participants (Mevel et al., 2015 being the exception). This is an important area for future 
research.  
 Although the debate about the modal biased reasoner is important in the context of 
individual reasoning paradigms, I hasten to add that these perspectives are not mutually 
exclusive and, in fact, my three-stage model accommodates both (see also, Stanovich & West, 
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2008; Figure 1). I even found evidence for both detection and inhibition failures using the rapid-
response base-rate task. Here, participants took longer on conflict problems relative to the non-
conflict baseline problems when the analysis was isolated to cases when stereotypical (‘biased’) 
responses were given. This indicates that they were able to detect the conflict but failed to inhibit 
the intuitive stereotypical response. However, I also found evidence for large variability in this 
conflict detection effect – both across individuals and as a result of subtle manipulations. Indeed, 
a number of the relatively more biased individuals were not apparently able to detect the conflict 
between moderate base-rates and salient stereotypes. This indicates that detection failures also 
occur. These findings are easily accommodated by my three-stage model of analytic engagement. 
Dual-processing: Theory, metatheory, and criticisms 
 Although dual-process theory is widely accepted and has been applied in multiple 
domains of psychology (see Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013a), there have been a number 
of recent critiques (e.g., Keren, 2013; Keren & Schul, 2009; Kruglanski, 2013; Kruglanski & 
Gigerenzer, 2011; Osman, 2004; 2013). There are two general classes of criticism that are levied 
against dual-process theories: 1) Sufficient evidence for two types of processes is lacking and the 
extant data can just as easily, and more parsimoniously, be explained by unimodal theories, and 
2) Dual-process theories are unfalsifiable, are poorly defined, fail to motivate new questions and 
yield testable predictions, or some combination of these things. The current work represents a 
consequential implementation of a dual-process perspective and, as such, it is worthwhile 
discussing how it speaks to such theoretical and metatheoretical debates. It is also necessary to 
situate my three-stage dual-process model within the context of these criticisms. 
 Evans and Stanovich (2013a) have argued that Type 1 and Type 2 processes are 
qualitatively different because Type 1 processes are autonomous (i.e., “... the execution of Type 
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1 processing is mandatory when their triggering stimuli are encountered... ” p. 236) whereas 
Type 2 processes require a deliberative instantiation of working memory resources. Kruglanski 
(2013, see also Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011) has argued that because the speed at which 
something autonomously comes to mind (via Type 1 processing) is likely dependent on the 
strength of the stimulus-response pairing, the responses that either come to mind or are generated 
later in the reasoning process are simply those that are associated with a weaker stimulus-
response pairing (for a related argument, see Osman, 2004; 2013). In other words, Type 1 and 2 
outputs differ based on a continuum. However, consider the following argument (Kruglanski, 
2013): “If the quickly activated thought [a Type 1 intuition, or IR1 in my model] seemed 
appropriate to the cognizer’s task, it might be adopted and acted upon. If it seemed less than 
satisfactory, the individual may keep on searching for more appropriate albeit less accessible 
notions, but only if she had the motivation and mental resources to do so (see Kruglanski et al., 
2012)” (p. 249). Here the argument appears to fall back to the familiar dual-process dichotomy. 
The initial process that generates outputs based on stimulus-response pairings is supplemented 
by a later process that determines if the initial output is satisfactory and that may initiate a search 
for alternatives. This is captured in my three-stage model, though I (unlike Kruglanski) 
emphasize the distinction between the initial and later processes. This distinction – or, in other 
words, my dual-process perspective – allows me to not only explain why thoughts or responses 
are generated, but why they might be considered further. If the initial generated response (IR1) 
does not conflict with an additional autonomously generated response (IR2), this further 
consideration may be cursory. However, when a conflict is successfully detected, the reasoner 
will spend more time and effort thinking analytically. This may take the form of rationalization 
or cognitive decoupling, the latter of which allows for novel combinations of distant semantic 
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concepts (see Barr et al., 2014) – a process that is difficult to accommodate in a rule-based 
stimulus-response model. 
 The second major criticism of dual-process theories relates to the difference between 
theory and metatheory (Evans & Stanovich, 2013b). Dual-process theories in their general form 
are metatheoretical in that they distinguish between ‘intuitive’ and ‘reflective’ types of processes 
but do not elaborate on how that distinction bears on any given task. As a consequence, general 
dual-process theories are not falsifiable and do not lead to testable predictions (see Keren, 2013; 
Keren & Schul, 2009). However, a dual-process perspective can be used to generate testable and 
falsifiable models that are specific to a type of task or phenomenon. If done successfully, this 
evidences the value of dual-process theories as a metatheoretical perspective. Moreover, the 
likelihood that the distinction between intuition and reflection is misguided becomes 
decreasingly small with increasing numbers of successful applications of dual-process theory.  
 Our three-stage model represents a testable and falsifiable instantiation of dual-process 
theory. The model is specific in that it was designed to explain the cognitive processes involved 
in solving the types of tasks or problems that contain conflicting sources of information, but 
general in the sense that conflicting information is presumably very common. Moreover, the 
model is clearly defined and makes straightforward predictions. I consider the current work to be 
a representative case for a meaningful and successful application of a dual-process 
metatheoretical perspective.  
Beyond base-rate neglect 
 Although I focused entirely on base-rate problems here, the three-stage model should be 
applicable in any case where a problem or cue may engender conflicting responses. To illustrate 
this point I will outline two further examples. The first will serve as an example of how the 
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three-stage model accommodates recent experimentation in a traditional reasoning paradigm 
(namely, belief bias in syllogistic and conditional reasoning). The second example – goal conflict 
– will illustrate how the three-stage model can be applied to a different area of research 
altogether. 
 Belief bias. Belief bias refers to the tendency to endorse the conclusion of a deductive 
argument based on its believability instead of its logical structure. Consider the following 
example (Sa´, West, & Stanovich, 1999):    
 All plants need water. 
 Roses need water. 
 Therefore, roses are plants.  
This syllogism contains a conflict between logic and belief such that the conclusion is logically 
invalid (i.e., the conclusion does not follow from the premises) but nonetheless believable (i.e., 
roses are indeed plants). As a result, participants often incorrectly endorse the conclusion as 
logically valid (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983). Nonetheless, a number of studies have 
demonstrated that participants are able to detect the conflict between logic and belief; a finding 
that applies to both syllogisms (Ball, Phillips, Wade & Quayle, 2006; De Neys & Franssens, 
2009; De Neys, Moyens, & Vansteenwegen, 2010; Stupple & Ball, 2008; Stupple, Ball, & Ellis, 
2013) and conditionals (Handley, et al., 2011). According to the three-stage model (see also, De 
Neys, 2012), this conflict detection indicates that some or most participants must be intuitive 
logicians. For a conflict between logic and belief to be reliably detected, both factors must cue a 
Type 1 output. Presumably, then, belief bias tends to dominate logic partially because belief 
provides a quicker, more salient Type 1 output.  
 There is evidence to support the counterintuitive claim that all logic does not necessarily 
require Type 2 processing. In a typical syllogistic reasoning study, participants are informed to 
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assume that all premises are true and that they should only endorse a conclusion if it necessarily 
follows from the premises. Under these instructions, logical responding decreases when the 
influence of Type 2 processing is diminished through a time deadline (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 
2005) or secondary task (De Neys, 2006). These findings, along with the positive correlation 
between cognitive capacity and logical responding (Sa´ et al., 1999), indicate that logical 
reasoning requires Type 2 processing. However, across a number of experiments, Handley, 
Newstead, & Trippas (2011) employed an instruction manipulation where participants were 
asked to give a logical response (as in previous studies) or belief-based response. Contrary to 
what would be expected if logic requires Type 2 processing, participants took longer for conflict 
than non-conflict problems regardless of the instruction manipulation. In other words, the logical 
structure of the problems interfered with belief-based responses. This cross-interference effect 
replicated across different presentation formats and using both conditionals and syllogisms. The 
claim that belief and logic may cue a Type 1-Type 1 conflict is, at the very least, made plausible 
by these findings (see Handley & Trippas, 2015).      
 Goal conflict. Cases where one’s desire trumps a potentially more beneficial goal are 
common and, as such, have been the focus of much philosophical and psychological debate (e.g., 
Baumeister, Heatherington, & Tice, 1994; Mele, 1995; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; Thaler & 
Shefrin, 1981). A great deal of psychological research has highlighted how self-control can be 
accomplished through an override of salient desires or impulses via finite cognitive resources 
(e.g., Baumeister, Bratlavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 
2010; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000). However, more recent research has highlighted an alternative 
source of self-control lapses: i.e., the failure to recognize the conflict between a desire and a goal 
in the first place (e.g., Hofmann & Kotabe, 2012; Myrseth & Fishbach, 2009). 
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According to the three-stage model, the probability of detecting a conflict between a 
standard (goal) and a temptation/desire will be determined by the relative speed at which the two 
(or more) representations come to mind. In other words, the key to conflict detection in the case 
of self-control conflicts is the degree to which a standard (IR2) lags a temptation/desire (IR1). 
Consider the case of a New Year’s resolution to eat healthier. This is a relatively salient goal on 
January 1st but less salient on February 1st. If, on the 1st of January, a piece of cake is 
encountered, it is likely that the conflict will be detected because the goal should come to mind 
fast enough to interrupt the decision to eat cake. On February 1st, in contrast, the goal still exists 
but is clearly less salient. In such cases it is less likely that the individual will recognize that they 
are about to commit a self-control failure (see Karlan, McConnell, Mullainathan, & Zinman, 
2010). This pattern could also be influenced by the salience of the temptation. It would be 
difficult even on January 1st for a very hungry person to recognize that eating a slice of cake 
conflicts with a more abstract goal. Although this is clearly speculative, this example 
demonstrates how the three-stage model of analytic engagement could be applied in an entirely 
different domain of research.   
Limitations and further specifications 
 Other sources of Type 2 processing. The goal of the three-stage model is to elucidate the 
low-level cognitive sources of analytic engagement, and I have highlighted conflict monitoring 
as a key mechanism. As such, I have used a paradigm where participants think more analytically 
about some items relative to others in the absence of an explicit cue such as an instruction 
manipulation. This should not be taken to imply, however, that analytic processing cannot occur 
in the absence of successful conflict detection. Explicit cues to think analytically (such as an 
instruction to think logically, see Daniel & Klaczynski, 2006; Evans et al., 1994; Evans et al., 
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2010; Vadeboncoeur & Markovits, 1999) may alter the course of analytic reasoning after conflict 
monitoring has been completed – for example, by shifting a participant from simply verifying an 
initial response to rationalizing or even decoupling. Indeed, an added benefit of the three-stage 
model is that it permits a higher degree of specificity when discussing alternative sources of 
Type 2 processing. For example, it is possible for other types of interventions, such as practice or 
learning effects, to affect earlier stages of the reasoning process by altering the probability and 
speed at which initial responses come to mind (which, in turn, may affect the probability of 
analytic engagement following successful conflict detection).    
 Other classes of Type 2 processing? According to the three-stage model, decoupling and 
rationalization may be considered different “classes” of Type 2 processes. If analytic thought is 
engaged for more than simply verifying the initial response as adequate, the reasoner must either 
focus thought on the initial response (rationalization), suppress it in lieu of some other output 
(decoupling), or do some combination of these (i.e., moving back and forth between the two over 
time). However, it is important to note that there are naturally many forms that such processing 
takes. Consider, for example, a stereotype wherein a person described as shy and nerdy is 
initially judged to be a computer technician. One might rationalize this initial response by 
engaging hypothetical thought to simulate a computer technician conference full of shy and 
nerdy people. Or, perhaps, one might decouple from this stereotype by suppressing it and 
engaging hypothetical thought to imagine an outgoing computer technician. In this sense, 
decoupling and rationalization describe the association between whatever processing is occurring 
and the initial response.  
The three-stage model is consistent with default-interventionist models and may even be 
considered a default-interventionist model itself because Type 2 processing does not occur until 
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after Type 1 processes output a response. The primary difference between the three-stage model 
and traditional default-interventionist models (e.g., Evans, 2007; 2010) is that the former is 
interested in the causes of analytic intervention whereas the latter are typically focused on 
determining the common defaults that undermine reasoning (e.g., prior beliefs) and the problem 
factors that require intervention to enter into reasoning (e.g., logical validity). In other words, my 
three-stage model is focused on the “how” and previous default-interventionist models are 
typically focused on the “what”. In the three-stage model, it is possible for a factor traditionally 
associated with analytic processing such as base-rate probabilities or logical validity to be the 
source of a Type 1 output (see Handley & Trippas, 2015) – and, in fact, for some individuals it is 
quite possible that factors such as logic are more intuitive than factors such as belief (that is, 
logic cues IR1 and belief cues IR2). Moreover, manipulating problem structure (e.g., the format 
of base-rates, Evans, Handley, Perham, Over, & Thompson, 2000) or top-down factors such as 
instructions (Handley, et al., 2011; Pennycook, Trippas, et al., 2014) may alter the initial 
processing of the problems such that typically more intuitive responses are engendered more 
slowly (from IR1 to IR2) and typically less intuitive responses are engendered more quickly 
(from IR2 to IR1). In this way, the three-stage model is capable of accommodating both logical 
intuitions and effortful beliefs (for an extended discussion, see Handley & Trippas, 2015). 
Other measures. An additional limitation of the current work is that I have focused 
entirely on response time as an indicator of increased analytic engagement. Although RT has 
been used in a large number of conflict detection studies (e.g., Bonner & Newell, 2010; De Neys 
& Franssens, 2009; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Handley, Newstead, & Trippas, 2011; 
Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012; Stupple & Ball, 2008; Villejoubert, 2009), many 
additional measures have been used as well, including eye tracking (Ball, Phillips, Wade, & 
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Quayle, 2006), memory recall (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Franssens & De Neys, 2009), verbal 
protocols (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008), skin conductance response (De Neys, Moyens, & 
Vansteenwegen, 2010), confidence (De Neys, Cromheeke, & Osman, 2011; De Neys & 
Feremens, 2013; De Neys, Lubin, & Houdé, 2014; De Neys, Rossi, & Houdé, 2013; Rossi, 
Cassotti, Agogue, & De Neys, 2013; Stupple, Ball, & Ellis, 2013; Thompson & Johnson, 2014; 
Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011), liking ratings (Morsanyi & Handley, 2012), 
and neuropsychological measures like fMRI (De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008) and ERP 
(Banks & Hope, 2014; De Neys, Novitskiy, Ramautar, & Wagemans, 2010). Additional 
measures could be used to test key aspects of my three-stage model. For example, confidence 
ratings could reveal insights into the potential role of metacognition as an additional source of 
analytic engagement (discussed subsequently). Further, time-sensitive online measures of 
conflict sensitivity such as skin conductance and ERPs could be used to investigate the time 
course and relative efficiency of conflict detection. my model suggests that conflict detection 
occurs early in the reasoning process and depends on the speed at which competing Type 1 
outputs come to mind. A further possibility is that conflict monitoring itself is suspect to 
individual differences; perhaps as a consequence of differential anterior cingulate cortex 
functioning (Fornito et al., 2004). 
Future directions 
 I have focused on testing two primary claims that were derived from the three-stage 
model: 1) Conflict monitoring may sometimes fail, and 2) conflict detection and cognitive 
decoupling are separable and dissociable sources of Type 2 processing. However, there are other 
testable claims that can be derived from the model but that have not been investigated here. 
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Although each claim is grounded in prior theoretical and empirical work, it is necessary to be 
precise about the limits of the current investigation. This will hopefully guide future research.   
 Stage 1. According to the three-stage model, a stimulus may cue multiple Type 1 outputs 
that come to mind at different speeds. This is a key claim that has not been assessed here. I 
hasten to add, however, that the idea that multiple Type 1 outputs may be engendered by the 
same stimulus follows directly from the uncontroversial idea that Type 1 processes operate 
autonomously and in parallel (see Stanovich, 1999; 2004 for discussion of the “autonomous set 
of systems”). Moreover, the idea that some things come to mind more quickly and fluently than 
others is supported by decades of metacognition research (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; 
Benjamin, Bjork, & Schwartz, 1998; Schwarz, 2004; Whittlesea & Leboe, 2003; Whittlesea, 
Jacoby, & Girard, 1990). More directly, decreased answer fluency is associated with increased 
metacognitive “feelings of rightness” which, in turn, have been implicated as a source of 
increased Type 2 processing (Thompson et al., 2011; 2013). Further, Thompson and Johnson 
(2014) provide evidence that conflict detection decreases feelings of rightness, which, in turn, 
mediates the extent of subsequent Type 2 thinking.  
Further work is required to fully integrate metacognitive considerations into the three-
stage model. As an example, the model predicts that each Type 1 output is associated with a 
unique speed of processing and that the relation between these Type 1 outputs will partly 
determine what occurs later in the reasoning process. Is fluency only relative to the final 
response output (i.e., following Type 2 processing in Stage 3) or does each Type 1 output 
engender unique fluencies which, depending on their status relative to each other, determine a 
unique final fluency judgment? The three-stage model could facilitate future research such as 
this. 
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 Stage 2. The three-stage model allows for conflict monitoring failures; a component 
supported by both current and past data (e.g., Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012). But 
what causes detection failures? Assuming I accept the claim that some Type 1 outputs come to 
mind more quickly than others, it is plausible that the probability of conflict detection success is 
determined by the relative differences in the speed at which competing Type 1 outputs come to 
mind. This possibility has not been directly tested here. Conflict detection was less efficient 
when base-rates were moderate (e.g., 700 lawyers, 300 engineers) than when extreme (e.g., 995 
lawyers, 5 engineers) (Experiments 2-4; see also, Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012), but 
this difference was mitigated if extreme base-rate problems were presented in a block prior to 
moderate ones (Experiment 3). Manipulating conflict detection in this way supports the idea that 
conflict monitoring is not perfectly efficient, but the mechanisms underlying this effect are still 
unclear. Does prior experience with salient extreme base-rates facilitate processing of moderate 
base-rates? This would decrease the difference in processing speed between moderate base-rates 
and stereotypes and make conflict detection more likely. Alternatively, it may be that extreme 
base-rates draw more attention, thereby decreasing the likelihood that they will be 
misrepresented at the level of language comprehension (Mata, Schubert, & Ferreira, 2014). I 
have focused on testing the higher level distinctions made by the three-stage model (i.e., Stages 2 
and 3) at the expense of these types of lower level issues (i.e., Stage 1). Future research should 
focus on further specification of Type 1 processing (see Thompson, 2014).  
Stage 3. I focused on base-rate problems to which there are only two potential responses 
(i.e., the stereotypical response, IR1, or the base-rate response, IR2) and, as such, the generation 
of alternative responses (AR) was not investigated despite being included in the three-stage 
model. According to the model, it is impossible for a response to be generated that is not 
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sourced, to some degree, by an autonomous (Type 1) response. In other words, the Type 2 
processing that occurs at Stage 3 requires an earlier Type 1 output from Stage 1. Novelty arises 
when semantically distant representations are combined via cognitive decoupling (i.e., “reasoned 
connections”; see Barr et al, 2014). This alternative response generation process allows for a 
response to be generated that was not initially available through Type 1 processing. For example, 
in the Remote Associates Test (RAT) participants are asked to generate a common associate for 
a set of ostensibly unrelated words (e.g., “sore, shoulder, sweat”). Correctly solving such a 
problem requires an insight about the common connection between the semantically distant 
words (e.g., “cold”). Barr et al. (2014) theorized that this connection is facilitated by activation 
of Type 2 processing and, consistent with this idea, found that performance on the RAT (and 
other related creativity tasks) is strongly correlated with measures thought to assess individual 
differences in analytic thinking (see also Ball & Stevens, 2009; Chein & Weisberg, 2014). This 
indicates that an initially unavailable response became available through an increase in analytic 
engagement, perhaps as a result of iterations of the processes described in the three-stage model.  
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Conclusion 
 What makes us think? Of interest here are not the more obvious content-related answers 
to this question – a good book or a stimulating conversation – rather, my goal was to better 
understand the cognitive architecture of analytic thought. To this end, I proposed a three-stage 
dual-process model that combines elements of previous reasoning models with novel insights. I 
also provided evidence for integral components of my model from response time analyses using 
a rapid-response base-rate task.   
Although the question of what cues analytic thought has received some attention in recent 
years (e.g., De Neys, 2012; Evans, 2009; Stanovich, 2009a; Thompson, 2009), there is still a 
great deal of work to be done. This represents a rather striking gap in our knowledge, as the 
capacity to think and reason is often considered the paragon of what makes us uniquely human. 
Moreover, obtaining a stronger understanding of the bottom-up factors that lead to analytic 
thought could lead to more efficient debiasing interventions and, as a consequence, better 
decision-making. my principle goal in the current work was to inspire and guide such research. 
In a world where ‘truthiness’ too often triumphs over truth, I can scarcely think of a more 
important academic pursuit.       
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